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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a3(2)(j) (2001) ("The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (j) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court.").1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW2
Did the district court correctly grant Salt Lake City Corporation's (City)
Motion to Dismiss based on Plaintiff William P. Ramey's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 10-9a-801(l)
and Mr. Ramey's failure file a Notice of Claim in compliance with the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Annotated section 63-30d-401
(2004), et seq.?
Did the district court correctly deny Mr. Ramey's request for postjudgment
relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60?
1

In the statement of jurisdiction, Mr. Ramey's brief mistakenly cites Utah Code
Annotated section 78-2-2a(3)(2). This Code section does not exist.
2

Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation restates the issues presented for review
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(1), because the City is
"dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant." Mr. Ramey's presentation of the
issues includes the trial court's denial of his request for a Temporary Restraining
Order (Ramey Brief p. 1, issue 2) and the trial court's failure to address his claims
for injunctive relief (id., issue 3). Neither of these issues was preserved for appeal
through designation in Mr. Ramey's notice of appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(d) requires that "[t]he notice of appeal shall . . . designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." Id. See footnote 9, infra, for
analysis of this issue.
1

Standard of Review
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for correctness.
"Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law,
which this Court reviews 'under a correction of error standard, giving no particular
deference to the trial court's determination.'" Xiao v. University of Utah, 2006 UT
575 ^[7,144 p.3d 1142; see also State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ^10, 975 P.2d
489.
RELEVANT STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Annotated
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701 (2005) (Appeal authority required-Condition
precedent to judicial review—Appeal authority duties.)
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish
one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide:
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances.
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person
shall timely and specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in
accordance with local ordinance.
(3) An appeal authority:
(a) shall:
(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and
(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or
application of land use ordinances; and
(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or
any participating member, had first acted as the land use authority.
(4) By ordinance, a municipality may:
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than
the appeal authority it designates to hear appeals;

2

(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types
of appeals of land use authority decisions;
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority
every theory of relief that it can raise in district court;
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive
appeals before the same or separate appeal authorities as a condition of the
adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed
directly to the district court.
(5) If the municipality establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has
established a multiperson board, body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a
minimum the board, body, or panel shall:
(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body,
or panel;
(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to
municipal resources as any other member;
(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and
(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l) (2007) (No district court review until
administrative remedies exhausted).
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision
made under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this
chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative
remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if
applicable.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101, et seq. (Governmental Immunity Act of Utah).
Because of its length, section 63-30d-101 (2004) et seq. is attached in the
Addendum at 2.
Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances
$ 21A.12.040(D) (Procedures).

3

"Any person adversely affected by an interpretation rendered by the zoning
administrator may appeal to the board of adjustment in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 21 A. 16 of this part."

$ 21A.16.020 (Parties Entitled To Appeal).
"An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision
administering or interpreting this title [21 A, Zoning] may appeal to the board of
adjustment."

$ 21A.16.040 (Appeal of Decision).
"Any person adversely affected by any decision of the board of adjustment
may, within thirty (30) days after the decision is made, present to the district court
a petition specifying the grounds on which the person was adversely affected."

§ 21A.36.020B (Conformance With Lot And Bulk Controls),
"Central air conditioning systems, heating, ventilating, pool and filtering
equipment, the outside elements shall be located not less than 4 feet from a lot
line."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
4

except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Ramey3 brought this action relative to property he owned at 38 South
1000 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, after a Certificate of Noncompliance (the
Certificate) was placed on the property due to the improper placement of an air
conditioning unit. The unit was placed too close to the property line, in violation
of a City building code.
On December 14, 2006, Mr. Ramey filed his Complaint and Request for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in Third District Court.
3

Although Mr. Ramey is appearing pro se, he is a member of the Utah State Bar,
number 10901 (inactive status). While courts may be "generally lenient with pro
se litigants," Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,1f4, 67 P.3d 1000, Mr. Ramey "is not
in the same position as most pro se litigants in t h a t . . . he is law trained." State v.
Schwenke, 2007 WL 3197537, * l n . l , 2007 UT App 354 (unreported decision)
(Addendum at 5).
5

(R. at 1-19; Addendum at 1.) After hearing the parties' oral arguments, the trial
court denied the request for a Temporary Restraining Order in a minute entry. (R.
at 69-71.) Subsequently, on January 11, 2007, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss
and a Memorandum in support thereof, based on the fact that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the case because of Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies and his failure to file a Notice of Claim pursuant to Utah
statute. (R. at 89-91.) The City argued that the lack of jurisdiction required the
trial court to dismiss Mr. Ramey's Complaint.
After the parties fully briefed the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court held a
hearing on March 12, 2007. At that hearing, Mr. Ramey stated that he filed a
Notice of Claim on January 5, 2007, which was twenty-two days after he filed the
Complaint. (R. 238.) On March 14, 2007, the trial court granted the City's
motion to dismiss in a minute entry. (R. 162-165.) Mr. Ramey then filed a
Request for Relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, which, after
briefing, the trial court denied. (R. 166-68; 208-10.) On May 15, 2007, the trial
court issued a Final Order granting the City's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), based on the court's lack of jurisdiction. (R. 21115.) Mr. Ramey filed a Notice of Appeal on June 14, 2007 (R. 216-19). On July
30, 2007, a Certificate of Correction and Compliance, documenting that the zoning
violation on the property at issue had been corrected and removing the Certificate
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of Noncompliance from the property, was filed and recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office. (Addendum at 3.)4
II.

Statement of Undisputed Facts5

Mr. Ramey filed his Complaint concurrently with his Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. (R. at 1-40.) His Complaint contained ninetyseven separately numbered paragraphs. (R. at 1-19.) He alleged his right to
recover damages from the City based upon the following legal theories: 1)
Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Contract (R. at 8,fflf43-46);
2) Negligent Misrepresentation (R. at 9,ffi[47-52) and (R. at 9-10,ffi[53-58); 3)
Negligence (R. at 10,ffif59-63); 4) Fraud (R. at 9-11, ^ 64-67), Wrongful
Recordation and Wrongful Attachment (R. at 11-12, ^ 68-72); 5)
Conversion/Trespass to Try Title/Trespass to Real Property (R. at 12-13, ^ 734

The City acknowledges that the Certificate of Correction and Compliance was
filed after the decision below and therefore is not in the Record. Nevertheless, this
Court may take judicial notice of it because it is a public record and discloses that
an issue has been mooted by actions subsequent to the proceedings below. "[A]
reviewing court may take judicial notice of events or facts which, while not
appearing in the record, disclose that an issue has been mooted." AmJur Evidence
§ 44. See Argument, subsection C, infra, arguing that because the zoning
violation has been remedied, and the Certificate of Noncompliance removed, Mr.
Ramey's requests for injunctive relief are moot. The City will file a Motion
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 37, Suggestion of Mootness, on this
issue.
5

The City does not address facts which it deems irrelevant to determination of this
case. The City is admitting these facts for purposes of this appeal only. The City
also notes that Mr. Ramey never cites to the record in his appellate brief. This
violates Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e), which requires "[references
shall be made to the pages of the original record." Further, subsection (k) of Rule
24 states, "briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken."
7

77); 6) Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property (R. at 13-14,fflf78-81); and 7)
Slander of Title (R. at 14-15,ffij82-86, 87-91). Based upon these legal theories,
Mr. Ramey filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, (R. at 15-16,ffif92-97), including requests for damages (R. at 17),
attorney's fees (R. at 17,ffl|E & G), costs (R. at 17, U F), and "treble damages"
(R.atUG(2)).
Mr. Ramey's Complaint alleged that the damages and other relief were
based upon his claim that the City improperly filed a "Notice of Non-Compliance"
(Certificate) related to property Mr. Ramey owned at 38 South 1000 East in Salt
Lake City, Utah. (R. at 2, 3 If 8). The Certificate of Noncompliance at issue,
dated November 21, 2006 (R. at 119), specifically stated that the noncompliance is
with respect to Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances section 21 A.36.020(B). Mr.
Ramey alleged that the City wrongfully filed the Certificate despite previously
indicating that an air conditioning unit on Ramey's property met the City's
requirements. (R. at 3-8, ^ 10-42). Specifically, Mr. Ramey alleged that the air
conditioning unit on his property, which violated City Code by being too close to
his property line, should be allowed to remain in place. (Id.) His Complaint
alleged that he had exhausted his administrative remedies when he received
"approval for the placement of the A/C unit when he purchased the property." (R.
at 8, ^] 41.) The Complaint also alleged alternatively that he was not required to
file a Notice of Claim pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah

8

because the City had notice of his allegations, and that he did file a Notice of
Claim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint because it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction. Under Utah Code Annotated section 10-9a801(1), there is no jurisdiction to hear Mr. Ramey's allegations because he failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. Further, Mr. Ramey's failure to file a
Notice of Claim with the City, as is required by the Governmental Immunity Act
of Utah, is fatal to his claim and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 et seq. (Governmental Immunity Act of Utah). Even if
Mr. Ramey has alleged equitable claims in addition to his claims for monetary
damage, he is still required to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to state
statute. See Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, fl9, 67 P.3d 466 (holding,
under predecessor statute, administrative process cannot be avoided in favor of
filing equitable claims directly in district court). Because of these deficiencies, the
trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b).
ARGUMENT
The trial court's Order in this case granting the City's Motion to Dismiss, filed
May 15, 2007, cites Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (1). (R. at 21115.) A court may consider facts alleged outside the complaint in a 12(b)(1) ruling,

9

but not in a 12(b)(6) ruling. In Millet v. Logan City, this Court explained the
standard used when reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) motion:
A trial court's decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint... is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court's ruling. When reviewing for correctness, we
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those
facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff as the non-moving party.
2006 UT App 466, ^[5, 147 P.3d 971 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). In Wheeler v. McPherson, the Court explained that different factual
allegations may be considered in 12(b)(1) motions: "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12 . . . does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) through (5) . .. into
motions for summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative
evidence relating to the basis for the motion." 2002 UT 16, ^20, 40 P.3d 632
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, even if the trial court
considered evidence outside of the Complaint, its grant of the Motion to Dismiss
was still correct and should be upheld by this Court.

A. Because Mr. Ramey Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies,
the Court below Correctly Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction.
Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies required the
trial court to dismiss his Complaint. In this case, Mr. Ramey had a right to appeal
his dispute under Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances sections 21 A. 12.040(D) and
21 A. 16.020. However, he does not claim in his Complaint, his Response to the
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Motion to Dismiss, or on appeal that he appealed to the Board of Adjustment and
received a result prior to filing in district court. Thus, Mr. Ramey had an
administrative remedy regarding a land use decision that he failed to exhaust prior
to filing suit. Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived
the trial court of jurisdiction, and it therefore correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's
Complaint.
Utah law states, "No person may challenge in district court a municipality's
land use decision made under this chapter, or under authority of this chapter, until
that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies." Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-801(l). Thus, prior to filing his Complaint, Mr. Ramey was required to
exhaust administrative remedies, by appealing the land use decision and following
the appeal process outlined in the City's ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a701(l)(b) ("Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance,
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide: . . . (b) appeals from
decisions applying the land use ordinances.") Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving it with "'only the
authority to dismiss the action.'" Horn v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95,
99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569,
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
The land use decision at issue found that the location of an air conditioning
unit on Mr. Ramey's property did not comply with the City's zoning ordinance.
The Certificate of Noncompliance, dated November 21, 2006 (R. at 119),
11

specifically stated that the noncompliance is with respect to Salt Lake City Code
of Ordinances (SLCCO) section 21A.36.020(B). That land use ordinance requires
that central air condition systems "shall be located not less than 4 feet from a lot
line." Id, To appeal the decision that the unit does not meet this requirement, Mr.
Ramey was required to follow the City's procedure authorized by Utah Code
Annotated section 10-9a-801. Under City Code, "Any person adversely affected
by an interpretation rendered by the zoning administrator may appeal to the board
of adjustment in accordance with the provisions of chapter 21 A. 16 of this part."
SLCCO § 21A.12.040(D). Chapter 21A.16 specifically states, "An applicant or
any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or
interpreting this title [21 A, Zoning] may appeal to the board of adjustment."6
SLCCO § 21A. 16.020. However, rather than appealing the land use decision as
required by statute and ordinance, Mr. Ramey filed an action in district court.
Mr. Ramey argues that he was not required to exhaust his administrative
remedies, because his Complaint is about the City's policies and procedures, not
about the Certificate of Noncompliance.7 (Ramey Brief, p. 22, 24.) However, Mr.
Ramey's Complaint is based on the land use decision itself, and he is therefore
required to exhaust the statutorily mandated administrative remedies before a trial
6

Under either City Code section 21 A.12.040(D) or section 21A.16.020 Mr.
Ramey has an administrative remedy, to the same entity, which he did not exhaust.
Nevertheless, in his Complaint, Mr. Ramey repeatedly cites the City's filing of a
Certificate of Non-compliance against his property as a reason for filing his
Complaint. (R. at 9-15 atffi|46, 52, 58, 63, 65-66, 69-71, 74-76, 79-86, 91, 93-97,
and Prayer for Relief.)
12

court has jurisdiction to hear his case. See Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7,
Tfl|16-17, 67 P.3d 466 (interpreting predecessor statute and dismissing state law
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies available for municipal land
use decisions before filing in district court). Because Mr. Ramey failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies by appealing that decision as required by City
ordinance, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Ramey's Complaint and
properly dismissed it.
Further, if Mr. Ramey had followed the administrative appeal process
before pursuing relief in court, the purposes behind the exhaustion requirement
may have been met. The exhaustion requirement:
"serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and
promoting judicial efficiency," McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145,
112S.Ct. 1081, 117L.Ed.2d291 (1992), by allowing an agency to correct
its own mistakes and apply its expertise in resolving conflict and by
creating a factual record for judicial review, respectively.
Culbertson v. Bd. Of Co. Comm'ns of Salt Lake Co., 2001 UT 108, ^(28, 44 P.3d
642; see also Horn v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). By filing directly in state court, Mr. Ramey denied the City the opportunity
to apply its expertise and correct any mistakes, if necessary. Additionally, by
filing his action before the Board of Adjustment had the opportunity to review the
decision, Mr. Ramey sought to avoid the administrative hearing and attempted
instead to obtain relief directly from the court. The Utah legislature and the Salt
Lake City Council have made quite clear, however, that the statutory process
cannot be circumvented.
13

Mr. Ramey's dispute about the land use decision is appealable under Salt
Lake City Code of Ordinances section 21A.16.020 and section 21 A. 12.040(D).
Despite this plain language, Mr. Ramey does not claim in his Complaint, his
Response to the Motion to Dismiss, or on appeal that he appealed to the board of
adjustment and received a result prior to filing suit, because he cannot. Mr.
Ramey had an administrative remedy, regarding a land use decision, which he did
not exhaust before filing his Complaint. Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust deprived
the trial court of jurisdiction leaving it only with the authority to dismiss.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the dismissal below on this ground and need
go no further.

B. Mr. Ramey's Claims Were Correctly Dismissed Because He Failed to
Comply with the Requirements for Making a Claim Against a
Governmental Entity.
Even if the lower court could have overlooked Mr. Ramey's failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies, his failure to file a written Notice of Claim
against the City in compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and invalidated the claims outlined in his
Complaint.8 Under Utah law,

o

The City is also immune from suit for Mr. Ramey's claims, but because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, this issue was not briefed. Under the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, governmental immunity is not waived:
Under Subsections (3) and (4) [of the Act] if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
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Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written Notice of Claim with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) (2006) (emphasis added). The claimant can file
an action in court sixty days after filing the Notice of Claim if the governmental
entity or employee has either denied the claim or failed to respond to the claim.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-403 (2006).
Mr. Ramey argues that the City had notice of his claims, since he and the
City "were in constant communication throughout 2006." (Ramey Brief 26-27.)
Whether or not he and the City were in communication, he was still required to
follow the Notice of Claim provisions set out in section 63-30d-401(2), above.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the UGIA generally, and the
Notice of Claim provision in particular, "demands strict compliance with its
requirements to allow suit against governmental entities." Wlieeler v. McPherson,

(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent
inspection; . . .
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional . . . .
The City reserved its right to assert this immunity if and when Mr. Ramey brings
his claims in a court with jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-210 & 301.
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2002 UT 16, ^[13, 40 P.3d 632 (interpreting predecessor statute). The UGIA
requires plaintiffs to "file a written Notice of Claim with the [governmental] entity
before maintaining an action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) (2006)
(emphasis added).
In this case, Mr. Ramey does not allege that he filed a written Notice of
Claim with the City in compliance with the statute. In fact, Mr. Ramey admits that
he filed a Notice of Claim on or about January 5, 2007, twenty-two days after he
filed the Complaint in this action. (R. at 238, In. 22 ("I filed the Notice of Claim
on January 5, [2007]".)) Thus, Mr. Ramey failed to strictly comply with the
UGIA. "A plaintiffs failure to comply with the UGIA's Notice of Claim
provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." Patterson v. Am.
Fork City, 2003 UT 7,1J10, 67 P.3d 466. Therefore, the trial court's only option
was to dismiss the Complaint. See Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at ^f 16 (interpreting
predecessor statute and holding that because plaintiffs failed to strictly comply
with Act's Notice of Claim requirement "the district court correctly dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction"). The touchstone is not whether the
governmental entity knew of the issues that would be presented in the Notice of
Claim as Mr. Ramey asserts. (Ramey Brief p. 26-27.) Rather, the touchstone is
whether he followed the notice requirements. See Xiao v. Univ. of Utah, 2006 UT
57, Y7, 144 P.3d 1142 (reviewing dismissal for failure to comply with statute
under subject matter jurisdiction rubric).
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Mr. Ramey hints in his brief on appeal that he was not required to file a
Notice of Claim sixty days prior to filing a complaint in district court. (Ramey
Brief p. 17.) However, Utah law is clear that an action may only be instituted in
the district court after a Notice of Claim is either denied or the statutory period for
the governmental entity's response has run. Utah Code Annotated section 63-3Od403(2)(a) provides that "a claimant may institute an action in the district court
against the governmental entity" if the claim is denied. Municipalities have sixty
days in which to approve or deny a claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d403(1 )(a). At the end of the sixty day period the claim is deemed denied if the
municipality has not approved or denied the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d403(1 )(b). "[P]laintiffs with claims against the state 'may institute an action in the
district court' only after their 'claim is denied.'" Hall v. Utah Dept. ofCorr., 2001
UT 34, T[26, 24 P.3d 958 (interpreting predecessor statute). Thus, while an action
may be filed in district court earlier than sixty days from the Notice of Claim if the
claim is denied earlier, an action may not be initiated prior to or
contemporaneously with the claim being filed. In this case, Mr. Ramey filed his
Notice of Claim after filing suit with the district court, in contravention of the
statute. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
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C. Even if Mr. Ramey Has Alleged Equitable Claims, Those Claims Are
Now Moot.
Mr. Ramey also maintains that he is not required to comply with the Notice
of Claim requirement in the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah because his
claims are equitable. (Ramey Brief p. 25, 29-33.) In his Complaint, Mr. Ramey
requested equitable relief in the form of the removal and/or the non-enforcement
of the Certificate of Noncompliance. (R. at 16, prayer A-C.) Since filing his
Complaint, the zoning ordinance violation on Mr. Ramey's property has been
corrected, resulting in the removal of the Certificate of Noncompliance. See
Certificate of Correction and Compliance (Addendum 2) (documenting removal of
Certificate of Noncompliance because conditions which necessitated Certificate of
Noncompliance have "been corrected"). Therefore, the equitable relief Mr.
Ramey sought, through the removal and/or the non-enforcement of the Certificate
of Noncompliance, has occurred, mooting his equitable claims.9

9

As stated in footnote 2, supra, Mr. Ramey included the trial court's denial of his
request for a Temporary Restraining Order (Ramey Brief p. 1, issue 2) and the trial
court's failure to address his claims for injunctive relief (id., issue 3) in his
statement of the issues. Neither of these was preserved for appeal in his notice of
appeal, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d) ("[t]he notice of appeal
shall . . . designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from.").
However, even if this Court were to liberally construe Mr. Ramey's notice of
appeal under the "policy that where the notice of appeal sufficiently identifies the
final judgment at issue and the opposing party is not prejudiced, the notice of
appeal is to be liberally construed," State ex rel B.B, 2004 UT 39, ^10, 94 P.3d
252, these issues are now moot. As documented in the Certificate of Correction
and Compliance (Addendum 2), the Certificate of Noncompliance has been
removed. The puipose for which Mr. Ramey sought injunctive relief was met
when he took action to remedy the violation, and the Certificate of Noncompliance
was removed.
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Although the Certificate of Correction and Compliance is not in the Record,
this Court may take judicial notice of it. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(f),
judicial notice may be taken at "any stage of the proceedings," including on
appeal. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah App. 1987)
(taking judicial notice on appeal for the first time a bankruptcy discharge). In this
case, there was no opportunity for the issue to have been raised below; Mr. Ramey
did not correct the problem, allowing the City to remove the Certificate, until after
Mr. Ramey filed this appeal. See Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah
App. 1994) ("With very limited exceptions, judicial notice should not be used cto
get around the rule precluding raising issues for the first time on appeal.'")
(quoting Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456
(Utah App. 1988)). Accordingly, judicial notice may be taken that the Certificate
of Noncompliance has been removed, mooting Mr. Ramey's requests for
injunctive relief.10

Further, Mr. Ramey's briefing of the trial court's alleged error in "not
addressing [his] pending requests for injunctive relief is inadequate. (Ramey
Brief p. 35.) This section of his brief lacks any analysis or fact application in
violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed."). More strikingly, the three
cases he relies on for his proposition that the court erred by failing to address his
pending injunctive relief (SS v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter,
970P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998); and A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v.
Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999)) are not about pending injunctive
relief. In fact, injunctive relief is not discussed in any of these cases.
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This Court can decline to issue an opinion on a moot issue, which would be
appropriate in this case. See State ex rel SI, 1999 UT App 390,1J40, 995 P.2d 17
("we generally decline to render an advisory opinion on a moot issue"). ,f[A] case
is moot where the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants."
Jones v. Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). In this case,
the requested relief has been obtained.
Even if this Court declines to hold that Mr. Ramey's alleged equitable
claims are moot, the trial court still lacked jurisdiction to hear his equitable claims
because Mr. Ramey did not file a Notice of Claim or exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing. While true equitable claims are not governed by the Notice
of Claims provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, a litigant is still required
to exhaust his administrative remedies before going into court. See Patterson v.
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ^}12, 67 P.3d 466 (citing EIRancho Enter. Inc. v.
Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977)).
In Patterson v. American Fork City, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the
provisions of the UGIA "maybe inapplicable to some equitable claims." Id. at
Tfl9. However, in that case the court held that the Pattersons "cite no authority for
the proposition that the administrative process can be avoided in favor of filing
equitable claims directly in district court. Thus, Pattersons1 remaining equitable
claims must fail." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, in this case, Mr. Ramey does
not cite any relevant authority for his argument that he can avoid the
administrative process and simply file his administrative claims in district court.
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Moreover, Mr. Ramey's reliance on Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154
(Utah 1983) and El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778,
780 (Utah 1977), is misplaced. Each of these cases relies on specific statutory
provisions not at issue here. For instance, the statutory provision authorizing suit
in El Rancho was repealed, and the claims were subsumed under the
Governmental Immunity Act. See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1154. The statutory
provision at issue in Jenkins not only predated the Governmental Immunity Act,
but it also provided a distinct basis for the claim and included its own notice
provision. See id. Therefore, these cases are not applicable in the case before this
Court.
Additionally, Mr. Ramey's "equitable" claims deserve dismissal for the
separate reason that he "has an adequate remedy at law." City of Page v. Utah
Associated Mun. Power Syss., No. 2:05 CV 921, WL 1889882, *6 (D. Utah July 7,
2006) (Mem. Decision) (attached at Addendum 3), (citing Buckner v. Kennard,
2004 UT 78, K56, 99 P.3d 842). In Buckner v. Kennard, the Utah Supreme Court
stated, "[T]he general rule is that equitable jurisdiction is precluded if the plaintiff
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer substantial irreparable injury.
Equitable jurisdiction is not justifiable simply because a party's remedy at law
failed." Id. 2004 UT 78 at ^56 (internal citation omitted). However, the trial court
did not reach these issues, because it lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than
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dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11 Therefore, this Court
should uphold the trial court's grating of the City's Motion to Dismiss, despite Mr.
Ramey's arguments that some of his claims sounded in equity.

D. Mr. Ramey's Postjudgment Motion to Reconsider Was Correctly
Denied.
Mr. Ramey argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request to
reinstate his claims for relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.
(Ramey Brief p. 24, 36.) The trial court denied Mr. Ramey's Motion for Relief
Under Rule 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in a Minute Entry
dated May 9, 2007, ruling that the uMarch 14, 2007 Minute Entry accurately
reflected the issues, facts and correct legal ruling pertaining to this case;
furthermore, the Court's holding dismissing this action was without prejudice,
allowing plaintiff to revisit the issues if applicable procedural requirements are
met." (R. at 162-165.) In this ruling, the trial court reiterated its earlier decision
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
When considering requests for postjudgment motions to reconsider, this
Court has cited the Utah Supreme Court's decision that "'postjudgment motions to
reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.' [] Consequently, they will no
1

Although the trial court did not specifically reach these issues, it did hold that
there was no irreparable harm to Mr. Ramey in its minute entry denying the
request for a temporary restraining order. (R. at 69.) Accordingly, Mr. Ramey
had an adequate remedy at law and was not suffering irreparable harm.
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longer be recognized by this court." Radakovich v. Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454,
1J5, 147 P.3d 1195 (citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ^[6, 135 P.3d 861).
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Mr. Ramey's request, because it was an
impermissible postjudgment motion to reconsider, filed after the decision in Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24, T16, 135 P.3d 861.
This Court may also refuse to consider Mr. Ramey's request to review the
lower court's ruling denying his request for relief under rules 59 and 60 because
he offers neither analysis of his grounds for appeal nor application of the facts on
which he relies. Although courts may be "generally lenient with pro se litigants,"
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ^[4, 67 P.3d 1000, pro se parties are still required
to adequately brief issues pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. See
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed.")
More importantly, Mr. Ramey is a member of the Utah State Bar, and should be
held to the same standards as other attorneys. See footnote 3, supra. Mr. Ramey's
bald assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief is not
adequately briefed, and accordingly this Court need not reach the merits of his
claim. The trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The City respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's grant
of the City's Motion to Dismiss. This Court can affirm the trial court's dismissal

23

on either one of two grounds. First, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Mr. Ramey's claims because Mr. Ramey had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Second, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction
because Mr. Ramey had failed to strictly comply with the requirements in the
Notice of Claim provision of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Under
either theory, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss
the case.12
This Court can also affirm the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Ramey's
request for postjudgment relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.
Such postjudgment motions are not recognized by the Utah rules, and the request
was properly denied. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of the City's
motion to dismiss.

Dated this \ J

day of November, 2007.

MARGARET D. PLANE
EVELYN J. FURSE
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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In his conclusion, Mr. Ramey reiterates his request for attorney fees from the
trial court action and requests attorney fees on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court
has affirmed the rule in this jurisdiction that "pro se litigants should not recover
attorney fees for successful litigation." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996). Even if Mr. Ramey were successful,
he would not be entitled to fees.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

William P. RAMEY, III, an individual,
Plaintiff,

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND
REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.
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Plaintiff, William P. Ramey, III (hereinafter referred to as "Ramey"), an
individual, files this Original Complaint and Request Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Salt Lake City Corporation, a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Utah, (hereinafter referred to as USLC Corp")
pursuant to at least Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

/

The Parties
1.

Plaintiff William P. Ramey, III (hereinafter referred to as "Ramey"), is a

natural person residing at 3818 Garrott Street, Houston, Texas 77006 and owning real
property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102
2.

Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter referred to as USLC

Corp") can be served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the recorder at City Recorder's Office, Ken Cowley, 2001 S, State St.,
#N1600 Salt Lake City, Utah 84190. A courtesy copy has also been delivered to the Salt
Lake City Attorney's Office at 451 S. State St., Room 505, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Further, a courtesy copy has also been delivered to the Department of Community
Development, Planning and Zoning Division, 451 S. State St., Room 505, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.

Jurisdiction and Venue
3.

This is an action for tortious interference with contract and prospective

contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, wrongful recordation, wrongful
attacliment, conversion, trespass to try title, trespass to real property, slander of title, and
for various other related claims under applicable state law.
4.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Title 78,

Chapter 3, Section 4 of the Utah Code.
5.

Venue is proper in this Judicial District because a substantial part of the

events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. Further, venue is proper in this
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judicial District because the underlying real property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake
City, UT 84102 is located within this judicial District.
THREE MAIN POINTS FOR PLEADINGS
Ramey is a Bona Fide Purchaser for Value
6.

Ramey asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser for value relying on the

permits issued by the City in the purchase of the SLC Property. All permits indicated
that the SLC property was in compliance. All inspections were Final. No Notices of
Non-compliance were recorded against the SLC property at the time of Ramey's closing
on the SLC Property.
7.

Ramey's mortgage company searched the records at the time of closing

and also did not locate any Notice of Non-compliance.
8.

The SLC Corp filed a first Notice of Non-compliance after Ramey had

purchased and recorded his interest in the property. Ramey's purchase was partial cash
and a mortgage.
9.

The A/C Unit was therefore a pre-existing condition.

Ramey Acted in Reliance on SLC Corp Permits in Purchasing the SLC Property
10.

Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance on the SLC Corp's Final

Inspection permits.
11.

Ramey would not have purchased the property had the permits not been

issued as Final and Approved.
12.

The SLC Corp should not be allowed to remove validly issued Final

Inspection Permits after Ramey has relied on them in the purchase of the property.
Ramey Acted in Reliance on the Special Exception
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13.

After becoming aware of a Non-compliance recorded against the SLC

property, Ramey sought t have it removed by going the extraordinary expense of both
time and resources to prepare a Special Exception request for a previously granted Final
Inspection Permit.
14.

The SLC Corp's Planning and Zoning Division agreed with Ramey that

the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition on the SLC Property at the time of Ramey 5s
purchase and granted the Special Exception.
15.

When Ramey put his property on the market, the SLC Corp threatened to

prevent Ramey from selling the property by recording a Notice of Non-compliance
against the property.
16.

The SLC Corp should not be allowed to alter recorded records as it desires

after a valid Special Exception has issued from its office.
Background of Action
17.

On or about August 10, 2005 Plaintiff Ramey purchased certain real

property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 (hereinafter referred to as
"SLC Property") for $575,000.00 dollars. There were no Certificates of Non-compliance
recorded against the property. (See Affidavit of William P. Ramey, III, ^ 4.)(hereinafter
referred to as Affidavit)
18.

The SLC Property had undergone several years of restoration including all

electrical, plumbing and support structures. As such, there was a tremendous amount of
contractor work service performed at the SLC Property. (Affidavit, ^ 5)
19.

Many of these contract work services performed at the SLC Property

required special permitting and inspection procedures by the Defendant SLC Corp that
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results in an ultimate Final Inspection report whereby the SLC Corp approves the
contractor work services. (Affidavit, ^ 6)
20.

One such contractor work service was the placement of the Air

Conditioning Unit, specifically a Kenmore with exterior dimensions of 27" X 33" X 14".
The unit is a quiet, high efficiency slim-design Unit (hereinafter referred to as the A/C
Unit). (Affidavit, 11 7)
21.

Defendant SLC Corp performed several Mechanical inspections as to the

placement of this A/C Unit that ultimately resulted in Permit No. 199163, Final
Inspection, dated March 4, 2005, approved by, upon information and belief, Buck, #24.
A true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. (See Affidavit, ^ 8 and Exhibit
A)
22.

This final approval was the approval by the SLC Corp of the placement of

the A/C Unit. (Affidavit, % 8, Exhibit A)
23.

Plaintiff Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance upon the various

permits issued by the SLC Corp, especially the Final Approval of permit 199163.
(Affidavit, If 9)
24.

In or about April of 2006, Plaintiff Ramey became aware that the SLC

Corp had filed a Certificate of Non-compliance against the SLC Property.
25.

The alleged Non-compliance was the placement of the A/C Unit within

four (4) feet of the property line.
26.

Ramey contacted the SLC Corp's Planning and Zoning division and was

ultimately directed to Kevin LoPiccolo, Zoning Administrator (hereinafter referred to as
"LoPiccolo"). LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the Final Approval had been granted
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improperly. Ramey informed LoPiccolo that he had purchased the property in reliance
upon the permits issued by his office of the SLC Corp. Ramey informed LoPiccolo that
he felt he was a bona fide purchaser for value. (Affidavit, ^(11)
27.

Ramey and LoPiccolo spoke several more times over the next few weeks.

In fact, Ramey supplied the SLC Corp with copies of various final approvals that had
been lost by the SLC Corp. (Affidavit, If 12)
28.

LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the only option for Ramey to keep the

A/C Unit in its location was to file a Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, ^ 13), The
Special Exception allows the SLC Corp and/or the Community to approve a building
project.
29.

Ramey protested being required to seek approval for that which was

already approved. The SLC Corp has a procedure in place that was followed. Ramey
purchased the property in reliance on that procedure and the SLC Corp should not be
changing its mind at a later date. To allow the SLC Corp to make such changes removed
all certainty in the approval process. (Affidavit, ^ 14)
30.

However, Ramey did prepare the Special Exception request in an attempt

to comply with the SLC Corp. The Special Exception Request is a long process whereby
an Applicant provides a planned improvement, wit all of the specification drawings, the
$200 fee, the cost for the mailing, and the address labels. Putting the documents together
required about 20 hours worth of work and $204. a true and correct copy of Ramey's
Special Exception Request is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit.
31.

The Special Exception Request was a complete document and accepted by

the SLC Corp for review. (Affidavit, ^ 16)
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32.

Ramey contacted LoPiccolo on numerous occasions concerning the

Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, 1J 17)
33.

On or about June 19, 200, the SLC Corp granted the Special Exception

request. (Affidavit, 1f 18)
34.

Ramey was told by Piccolo that the granting of the Special Exception

Request was at least in part because the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition at the time
Ramey purchased the property and because of other adjacent properties to the SLC
Property likewise had A/C Units placed in comparable proximity to the property line,
namely the property at 42 South 1000 East. Shortly thereafter, the Special Exception was
recorded at the County Recorder's Office. (Affidavit, If 19)
35.

Ramey then moved to Houston, Texas in August of 2006. However,

Ramey still owns the SLC Property and has put it on the market. (Affidavit, ^ 20)
36.

On or about November 16, 2006, LoPiccolo contacted Ramey's agent and

stated that the placement of the A/C Unit was not in compliance. In response, Ramey
immediately contacted LoPiccolo, as they had talked before. LoPiccolo informed Ramey
that the SLC Corp was going to issue another Non-compliant against the SLC Property
for the placement of the A/C Unit. Ramey questioned LoPiccolo as to how that was
possible in light of the two previous approvals and the fact that Ramey was a bona fide
purchaser of the pre-exiting condition. LoPiccolo informed him that the SLC Corp was
requiring the action and there was nothing he could do. (Affidavit, 1f 21)
37.

Ramey's agent questioned whether the SLC property could be sold as it is

presently permitted. (Affidavit, ^|22),
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38.

Further, LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp has told Ramey's

neighbor that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance.
39.

(Affidavit, ^J23)

In response, Ramey has prepared and filed this document to require the

SLC Corp to honor its two previous approvals of the placement of the A/C Unit,
Conditions Precedent
40.

Plaintiff Ramey asserts that all conditions precedent to recovery under all

causes of action has been met.
41.

All administrative remedies have been exhausted. Ramey had an approval

for the placement of the A/C Unit when he purchased the property.
42.

Ramey then was required to get a Special Exception which was granted to

him by the SLC Corp.
COUNT I
Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Contract
43.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 42 of this Complaint.
44.

As set forth above, Defendant SLC Corp, by and through the Planning and

Zoning Division had granted approval of the placement of the A/C Unit through the
normal permitting procedure under permit 199163, granted March 4, 1995.
45.

Ramey purchased the property on August 10, 1995 when there were no

Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property. In August of 2006, Ramey
relocated to Texas and placed the SLC Property on the market. In November of 2006,
when the SLC Corp contacted Ramey's agent it committed an act of interference with
contract in that the SLC Corp was attempting to cause the agent not to market the
property in light of a non-existent compliance issue.
8

46.

The SLC Corp's action, by and through Kevin LoPiccolo and others will

act to dissuade purchasers, have acted to cause potential purchasers to look elsewhere,
and has acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property. Such damage carries a dollar
amount at least to the appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Noncompliance.
COUNT II
Negligent Misrepresentation
47.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 46 of this Complaint.
48.

The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to

honor its previously issued permits and Special Exceptions.
49.

At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would honor its

issued permits as to a bona fide purchaser or a purchaser of a pre-existing condition.
50.

The SLC Corp is not honoring its previously issued permit by threatening

Ramey to prevent the sale of his house.
51.

The SLC Corp is not honoring its previously issued Special Exception by

threatening Ramey to prevent the sale of his house.
52.

Ramey has been damaged by these threats and contacts at least to the

appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance at least to the
appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
COUNT III
Negligent Misrepresentation
53.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Complaint.
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54.

The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to not

falsely make accusations.
55.

At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would not contact

people to falsely state that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance.
56.

The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's agent and stated that the SLC

Property was not legally in compliance.
57.

The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and stated that the SLC

Property is not legally in compliance.
58.

Ramey has been damaged by these false statements by the SLC Corp at

least to the appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
All of the permits and a Special Exception have been issued by the SLC Corp.
COUNT IV
Negligence
59.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint.
60.

The SLC Corp has a duty to treat all subject properties in a particular

zoning area the same.
61.

The standard of care would be that the rules should be enforced the same

throughout a particular zoning area. The SLC property is in zoned R-2.
62.

The SLC Corp has not treated all property owners within Ramey's zone

the same or similar. Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has a similar A/C Unit
that should be treated like Ramey's A/C Unit.
63.

Ramey has been damaged by this action at least to the appraised value of

the SLC property without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
10

COUNT V
Fraud
64.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint.
65.

The SLC Corp's action of threatening to issue a Certificate of Non-

compliance and/or issuing a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit
is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by
preventing him from transferring title of the SLC Property.
66.

Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and

Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property
without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
67.

As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful

conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to
suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
Count VI
Wrongful Recordation and Wrongful Attachment
68.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint.
69.

The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Non-

compliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit
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is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey.
70.

The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for

the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely
without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was
approved. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of
the SLC Property.
71.

Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and

Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property
without the Certificate of Non-compliance at least to the appraised value of the property
without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
72.

As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful

conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to
suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
COUNT VII
Conversion/Trespass to TIT Title/Trespass to Real Property
73.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint.
74.

The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Non-

compliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit
is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis, Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey.
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75.

The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for

the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely
without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was
approved. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of
the SLC Property.
76.

Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and

Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct in that Ramey has been lost buyers in light of
the SLC Corp's actions, including the threats and unlawful communications at least to the
appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance.
77.

As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful

conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to
suffer irreparable harm.
COUNT VIII
Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property
78.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 77 of this Complaint.
79.

The SLC Corp is discriminating against Ramey in the sale of his property

by recording an improper Certificate of Non-compliance and for threatening to file an
improper Certificate of Non-compliance.
80.

Ramey is being treated differently than even his next door neighbor who

has a similar A/C Unit. Upon information and belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South
1000 East, has not been harassed or even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that
property.
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81

Ramey is being damaged by this disparate treatment in that the SLC

Property cannot be sold because of the thieats and actions fiom the SLC Corp
Accoidmgly, the SLC Corp is damaging Ramey at least to the amount of his mortgage
COUNT IX
Slander of Title
82

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth mparagiaphs 1 through 81 of this Complaint
83

Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo, made a false statement

to Ramey's neighbor and leal estate agent that the property was out of compliance
84

The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been approved and that a

Special Exception had been granted
85

The SLC Coip's actions damaged Ramey because he can now not sell the

SLC Property
86

The damages are at least the appiaised value of the house without the

Certificate of Non-compliance
COUNT X
Slander of Title
87

Ramey lestates and incoiporates heiein by leference the averments set

foith mpaiagiaphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint
88

Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo and, upon mfoimation

and belief, other SLC Corp employees, has spread the woid that the SLC pioperty is not
in compliance, a false statement
89

The SLC Coip knew that all of the permits had been appioved and that a

Special Exception had been gianted
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90.

The SLC Corp's actions damaged Ramey because he can now not sell the

SLC Property.
91.

The damages are at least the appraised value of the house without the

Certificate of Non-compliance.
COUNT XI
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
92.

Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set

forth in paragraphs 1 through 91 of this Complaint.
93.

Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction is warranted because:
(1) Ramey will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues in that
Ramey is not able to sell the property because of the threatened and/or Recorded
Notice of Non-compliance;
(2) The threatened injury to Ramey outweighs the damage that the SLC Corp may
experience, as there is quantifiable damage;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, serves the public interest in that it restores
certainty to various processes and prevent capricious action by SLC Corp; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Ramey will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim because Ramey has a validly issued permit and a granted
Special Exception.
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Effect of Allowing the SLC Corp to Record a Notice of Non-compliance
94.

Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance

removes all certainty from property records.
95.

Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance

removes all certainty from the special exception procedure.
96.

Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance

removes all certainty from the inspection process.
97.

Public policy dictates that the SLC Corp be estopped from recording

and/or enforcing another Notice of Non-compliance against the SLC Property.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Ramey demands a judgment in his favor and demands the
following relief:
A.

An Order temporarily Restraining the SLC Corp from recording and/or

enforcing a Notice of Non-compliance against the SLC Property for placement of the
A/C Unit on the North side of the property where it has been previously been approved
through the permit procedure under permit 199163 and through the Special Exception
Procedure,
B.

An Order prohibiting and permanently enjoining Defendant SLC Corp

from recording, enforcing, or tlireatening to record a Notice of Non-compliance against
the SLC Property for placement of the A/C Unit on the North side of the property where
it has been previously been approved through the permit procedure under permit 199163
and through the Special Exception Procedure.
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C.

A decree ordering Defendant to SLC Corp to file a Notice of Compliance

specifically stating that tho A/C Unit is property placed to prevent further abuse of
process by the SLC Corp.
D.

Or, in the alternative, an Order directing the SLC Corp to pay for the

moving the A/C Unit to a platform on the roof in a location agreed to by Ramey;
E.

An award of a reasonable attorney's fee for Ramey.

F.

An award of reasonable costs for Ramey, including travel costs and court

G.

Judgment against Defendant SLC Corp specifically including but not

costs.

limited to th? following, to the extent allowed by law: (1) actual monetary damages
sustained byjRamey, in the amount of at least $575,000.00 and the cash value of all
mortgage payments from the time of the first filed Notice of Non-compliance; (2) treble
damages kin light of the egregious conduct of the SLC Corp; (3) costs and prejudgment
interest; and!(4) attorneys' fees.
H.

Such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and just under

the circumstances.
Dated: December l_ /__, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

William P". k a m e ^ j n ^8.SouthJj0&rEasTSalt Lake"City, Utah 84102
3818GarrottSt,
Houston, Texas 77006
(713) 857-6005 (phone)
(713) 589-2243 (fax)
Pro Se
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Tab 2

63-30d-101. Title, scope, and intent.
(1) This chapter is known as the "Governmental Immunity Act of Utah."
(2) (a) The waivers and retentions of immunity found in this chapter apply to all functions of
government, no matter how labeled.
(b) This single, comprehensive chapter governs all claims against governmental entities or against
their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 63_10002.ZIP 1,918 Bytes
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63-30d-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any asserted demand for or cause of action for money or damages, whether arising
under the common law, under state constitutional provisions, or under state statutes, against a
governmental entity or against an employee in the employee's personal capacity.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes:
(i) a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, or commissioners;
(ii) members of a governing body;
(iii) members of a government entity board;
(iv) members of a government entity commission;
(v) members of an advisory body, officers, and employees of a Children's Justice Center created in
accordance with Section 67-5b-104;
(vi) student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance with Sections 53A-6-103 and
53A-6-104;
(vii) educational aides;
(viii) students engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program;
(ix) volunteers as defined by Subsection 67-20-2(3); and
(x) tutors.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the
individual holding that position receives compensation.
(c) "Employee" does not include an independent contractor.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as both are defined in this
section.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means each activity, undertaking, or operation of a governmental
entity.
(b) "Governmental function" includes each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a
department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(c) "Governmental function" includes a governmental entity's failure to act.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a
person may suffer to his person or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his
agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, community development and
renewal agency, special improvement or taxing district, local district, special service district, an entity
created by an interlocal agreement adopted under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act, or
other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal
property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes each office, department, division, agency, authority,
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, Children's Justice Center, or other
instrumentality of the state.
(10) "Willful misconduct" means the intentional doing of a wrongful act, or the wrongful failure to
act, without just cause or excuse, where the actor is aware that his conduct will
probably result in injury.
Amended by Chapter 329, 2007 General Session
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63-30d-201. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and each
employee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of
a governmental function.
(2) Notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-30d-301, a governmental
entity, its officers, and its employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the
implementation of or the failure to implement measures to:
(a) control the causes of epidemic and communicable diseases and other conditions significantly
affecting the public health or necessary to protect the public health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1,
Local Health Departments;
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b,
Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined in Section
26-23b-102, or a declaration by the President of the United States or other federal official requesting
public health related activities.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-202. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of employee - Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an
admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for a governmental entity or its employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor
may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a
governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), an action under this chapter against a governmental
entity for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of an employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
(b) Judgment under this chapter against a governmental entity is a complete bar to any action by the
claimant, based upon the same subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim.
(c) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any civil action or proceeding based upon the same subject
matter against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim,
unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or willful misconduct;
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of
safely driving the vehicle; or
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the person
incapable of safely driving the vehicle;
(iii) injury or damage resulted from the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be
unable to reasonably perform his or her job function because of:
(A) the use of alcohol;
(B) the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-4; or
(C) the combined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by
Section 58-37-4; or
(iv) in a judicial or administrative proceeding, the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, upon a
lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony material to the
issue or matter of inquiry under this section.
(4) Except as permitted in Subsection (3)(c), no employee may be joined or held personally liable for
acts or omissions occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-203. Exemptions for certain takings actions.
An action that involves takings law, as defined in Section 63-90-2, is not subject to the requirements
of Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, and 63-30d-601.
Amended by Chapter 306, 2007 General Session
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63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions.
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the requirements of
Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-4035 or 63-30d-601.
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or
associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition
that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal property, to
determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property;
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or
other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, if the property was
seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of state law;
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of Article I,
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation;
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorney fees under
Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802;
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act; or
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a land use regulation that imposes a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63, Chapter 90b, Utah Religious Land Use Act.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived as to any injury caused by:
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement.
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir,
or other public improvement.
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment.
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;

(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or
without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement;
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands;
(1) any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation;
(m) any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is along a ditch, canal, stream, or
river, regardless of ownership or operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river, if:
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or
by a county under Section 17-27a-401;
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is located is open to public use as
evidenced by a written agreement between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county where the trail is located; and
(iii) the written agreement:
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; and
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way or of the right-of-way where the trail
is located has, at minimum, the same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in
connection with or resulting from the use of the trail.
(o) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of
Section 41-6a-208;
(s) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can be
rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
(t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or
(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person
or entity.
Amended by Chapter 357, 2007 General Session
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63-30d-302. Specific remedies — "Takings" actions — Government Records Access and
Management Actions.
(1) In any action brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution for the
recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation, compensation and damages shall
be assessed according to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection
63-30d-301(2)(e) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404.
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relating to the governmental entity's response to a
claim, and the provisions of 63-30d-601, requiring an undertaking, do not apply to a notice of claim for
attorneys' fees filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404.
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection
63-30d-301(2)(e) may be brought contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a
subsequent action.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice -- Contents - Service - Legal disability - Appointment
of guardian ad litem.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant.
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in
Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of the employee.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to
the office of:
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school
district or board of education;
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or
special service district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah;
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim
is against any other public board, commission, or body; or
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental
entity under Subsection (5)(e).
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity
is sustained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental
entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential
claimant.
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63-30d-402 begins
when the order appointing the guardian is issued.
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing:

(i) the name and address of the governmental entity;
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered.
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is
accurate.
(c) The Division of Coiporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental

entities to complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a).
(d) (i) Newly incorporated municipalities shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the
time that the statement of incorporation and boundaries is filed with the lieutenant governor under
Section 10-1-106.
(ii) Newly incorporated local districts shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the
time that the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215.
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept
notices of claim on its behalf.
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall:
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity
and by county of operation; and
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy.
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it
was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection (5).
Amended by Chapter 329, 2007 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 63J0009.ZIP 4,456 Bytes

Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|AH Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007

63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim.
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of
Section 63-30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-403. Notice of claim - Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier
within 60 days - Remedies for denial of claim.
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied.
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, the governmental entity or
its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the
governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year
after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-501. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions.
(1) The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter.
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried as a small claims action.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-502. Venue of actions.
(1) Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake
County.
(2) (a) Actions against a county may be brought in the county in which the claim arose, or in the
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county.
(b) Leave may be granted ex parte.
(3) Actions against all other political subdivisions, including cities and towns, shall be brought in the
county in which the political subdivision is located or in the county in which the claim arose.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-601. Actions governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — Undertaking required.
(1) An action brought under this chapter shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
the extent that they are consistent with this chapter.
(2) At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court
that is:
(a) not less than $300; and
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in
the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-602. Compromise and settlement of claims.
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it does not
have a legal officer, may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or other relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may compromise and settle any
action against the state for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable:
(a) on the risk manager's own authority, if the amount of the settlement is $25,000 or less;
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or the attorney general's representative and the
executive director of the Department of Administrative Services if the amount of the settlement is
$25,000.01 to $100,000; or
(c) by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, State Settlement
Agreements, if the amount of the settlement is more than $100,000.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-603. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited — Governmental entity exempt from
execution, attachment, or garnishment.
(1) (a) A judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages.
(b) If a governmental entity would be required to pay the judgment under Section 63-30d-902 or 6330d-903, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment or portion of any judgment entered against its
employee in the employee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or includes exemplary or
punitive damages.
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30(1-604. Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee — Process for
adjustment of limits.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and subject to Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages
for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a
duty to indemnify, exceeds $583,900 for one person in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the
judgment to that amount.
(b) A court may not award judgment of more than the amount in effect under Subsection (l)(a) for
injury or death to one person regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is
characterized as governmental.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and subject to Subsection (3), if a judgment for property
damage against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to
indemnify, exceeds $233,600 in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
(d) Subject to Subsection (3), there is a $2,000,000 limit to the aggregate amount of individual
awards that may be awarded in relation to a single occurrence.
(2) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages awarded as compensation
when a governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public use without just
compensation.
(3) The limitations of judgments established in Subsection (1) shall be adjusted according to the
methodology set forth in Subsection (4).
(4) (a) Each even-numbered year, the risk manager shall:
(i) calculate the consumer price index as provided in Sections 1(f)(4) and 1(f)(5), Internal Revenue
Code;
(ii) calculate the increase or decrease in the limitation of judgment amounts established in this section
as a percentage equal to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index since the previous
adjustment made by the risk manager or the Legislature; and
(iii) after making an increase or decrease under Subsection (4)(a)(ii), round up the limitation of
judgment amounts established in Subsection (1) to the nearest $100.
(b) Each even-numbered year, the risk manager shall make rules, which become effective no later
than July 1, that establish the new limitation of judgment amounts calculated under Subsection (4)(a).
(c) Adjustments made by the risk manager to the limitation of judgment amounts established by this
section have prospective effect only from the date the rules establishing the new limitation of judgment
take effect and those adjusted limitations of judgment apply only to claims for injuries or losses that
occur after the effective date of the rules that establish those new limitations of judgment.
Amended by Chapter 71, 2007 General Session
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63-30d-701. Payment of claim or judgment against state — Presentment for payment.
(1) (a) Each claim, as defined by Subsection 63-30d-102(l), that is approved by the state or any final
judgment obtained against the state shall be presented for payment to:
(i) the state risk manager; or
(ii) the office, agency, institution, or other instrumentality involved, if payment by that
instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law.
(b) If payment of the claim is not authorized by law, the judgment or claim shall be presented to the
board of examiners for action as provided in Section 63-6-10.
(c) If a judgment against the state is reduced by the operation of Section 63-30d-604, the claimant
may submit the excess claim to the board of examiners.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-702. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision — Procedure by
governing body — Payment options.
(1) (a) Each claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment obtained against a
political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body of the political subdivision.
(b) The governing body shall pay the claim immediately from the general funds of the political
subdivision unless:
(i) the funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law or contract for other purposes; or
(ii) the political subdivision opts to pay the claim or award in installments under Subsection (2).
(2) If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current fiscal year, it may pay the
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in whatever other
installments that are agreeable to the claimant.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-703. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political
subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or, may jointly with one or more
other political subdivisions, make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of:
(1) making payment of claims against the cooperating subdivisions when they become payable under
this chapter; or
(2) for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the cooperating subdivisions from any
or all risks created by this chapter.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-704. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims, judgments, or insurance
premiums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a political subdivision may levy an annual
property tax sufficient to pay:
(a) any claim, settlement, or judgment;
(b) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(c) for the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or
judgments that may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) (a) The payments authorized to pay for punitive damages or to pay the premium for authorized
insurance is money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec.
5, Utah Constitution, even though, as a result of the levy, the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by
law is exceeded.
(b) No levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property.
(c) The revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any purpose other than those specified in
this section.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-801. Insurance — Self-insurance or purchase of liability insurance by governmental
entity authorized — Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance.
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may self-insure, purchase commercial insurance, or selfinsure and purchase excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against:
(a) any risk created or recognized by this chapter; or
(b) any action for which a governmental entity or its employee may be held liable.
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental entity may selfinsure with respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account.
(b) In creating the trust account, the governmental entity shall ensure that:
(i) the trust account is managed by an independent private trustee; and
(ii) the independent private trustee has authority, with respect to claims covered by the trust, to:
(A) expend both principal and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation,
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees; and
(B) pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which a
compromise settlement may be agreed upon.
(c) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust agreement between the governmental entity and
the trustee may authorize the trustee to:
(i) employ counsel to defend actions against the entity and its employees;
(ii) protect and safeguard the assets of the trust;
(iii) provide for claims investigation and adjustment services;
(iv) employ expert witnesses and consultants; and
(v) provide other services and functions that are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the
trust.
(d) The monies and interest earned on the trust fund may be invested by following the procedures and
requirements of Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Management Act, and are subject to audit by the state
auditor.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-802. Insurance — Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employees
outside scope of employment.
(1) A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by an employee of the governmental entity with
the express or implied consent of the entity, but which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of an
automobile accident, is not being driven and used within the course and scope of the driver's
employment is, subject to Subsection (2), considered to provide the driver with the insurance coverage
required by Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act.
(2) The liability coverages considered provided are the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-803. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not in compliance with act.
(1) If any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after June 30, 2004 that was purchased to
insure against any risk that may arise as a result of the application of this chapter contains any condition
or provision not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter, that policy, rider, or endorsement is
not invalid, but shall be construed and applied according to the conditions and provisions that would
have applied had the policy, rider, or endorsement been in full compliance with this chapter, provided
that the policy is otherwise valid.
(2) If any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after June 30, 1966 and before July 1, 2004
that was purchased to insure against any risk that may arise as a result of the application of this chapter
contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of the chapter, that policy,
rider, or endorsement is not invalid, but shall be construed and applied according to the conditions and
provisions that would have applied had the policy, rider, or endorsement been in full compliance with
this chapter, provided that the policy is otherwise valid.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-804. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or renewal.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or
renewed under this chapter only upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder.
(2) The purchase or renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-805. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized - No right to
indemnification or contribution from governmental agency.
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its employees against liability, in whole or in
part, for injury or damage resulting from an act or omission occurring during the performance of an
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, regardless of whether or
not that entity is immune from suit for that act or omission.
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public purpose.
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance providing coverage on behalf of a governmental entity
or employee for any liability defined by this section, regardless of the source of funding for the
coverage, the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its
employee for any loss or liability covered by the contract or policy.
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its employee under any faithful performance surety
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee for
any loss covered by that bond based on any act or omission for which the governmental entity would be
obligated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of Section 63-30d-902.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-901. Expenses of attorney general, general counsel for state judiciary, and general
counsel for the Legislature in representing the state, its branches, members, or employees.
(1) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to provide legal representation
to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of state government in cases where coverage under
the Risk Management Fund created by Section 63A-4-201 applies.
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide legal representation to the
judicial or legislative branches, the attorney general shall consult with the general counsel for the state
judiciary and with the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in defending their
respective branch, and in determining strategy and making decisions concerning the disposition of those
claims.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b), the decision for settlement of monetary claims in those cases
lies with the attorney general and the state risk manager.
(2) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel for the state judiciary,
determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its
members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other
political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general counsel to separately represent
and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes independent legal representation of the
state judiciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and
the attorney general in writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the decision for
settlement of claims against the state judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management
Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the state risk manager.
(3) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with the general counsel for the
Legislature, determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative
branch, its members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or
other political or legal differences, the Legislative Management Committee may direct its general
counsel to separately represent and defend it.
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent legal representation of the
Legislature, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the
attorney general in writing before undertaking that representation.
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the
decision for settlement of claims against the legislative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk
Management Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the state risk
manager.
(4) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provision of the Utah Code, the
attorney general, the general counsel for the state judiciary, and the general counsel for the Legislature
may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their
respective offices, including attorneys1 and secretarial salaries, in representing the state or any
indemnified employee against any claim for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable and in
advising state agencies and employees regarding any of those claims.
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Management Fund for this purpose.
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63-30d-902. Defending government employee - Request - Cooperation - Payment of
judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall defend any action
brought against its employee arising from an act or omission occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the employee shall
make a written request to the governmental entity to defend him:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense
on his behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on the entity in
connection with insurance carried by the entity relating to the risk involved.
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, including
the making of an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment,
the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment,
compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or, subject to any court rule or order, decline to
continue to defend, an action against an employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or
(iii) under color of authority; or
(b) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from conditions set forth in
Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c).
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity
shall inform the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a
defense, the basis for its refusal.
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any purpose in the action in
which the employee is a defendant.
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the defense of an
employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim.
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a reservation of rights
under which the governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment if any of the conditions set
forth in Subsection (3) are established.
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30d-903 affects the obligation of a governmental entity
to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section
63-30d-802.
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend, an action
against its employee under any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide
coverage up to the amount specified in Section 31A-22-304.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-903. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of
it, that the governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30d-902, the employee may recover
from the governmental entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in the
employee's defense.
(2) (a) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or
conducts the defense under a reservation of rights as provided in Subsection 63-30d-902(6), the
employee may recover from the governmental entity under Subsection (1) if the employee can prove
that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c) applied.
(b) The employee has the burden of proof that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30d202(3)(c) applied.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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63-30d-904. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment, compromise, or settlement based on a claim
against the governmental entity or an employee, the employee is not required to indemnify the
governmental entity for the payment.
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
Building Services and Licensing
451 South State Street, Room 218
535-6679
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

10179233
7/31/2007 1:16:00 PM $16.00
Book - 9497 Pg - 7024-7027
Gary W. Ott
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
TITLE WEST
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 4 P.

Sidwefl Number: 16-05-128-012-0000

CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION AND COMPLIANCE
BE IT KNOWN BY THESE PRESENTS:
1.
That I, Orion Goff, the undersigned Building Official of Building Services and Licensing, have either inspected,
or have caused to be inspected, the property within the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, known by
the street address of 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah said property being more particularly described as;
COM XT SE COR OF LOT 8 BLK 57 PLAT B SLC SUR N 2 J4 RD W 10 RD S 2 Y2 RD E 10 RD TO BEG 5654-0465
61B3-0772 7107-1798 7590-3001 8891-7342 9030-6260
Owner:

William P. Ramey

2.
That the conditions which caused said property to be declared a substandard building, as noted in that
Certificate of Noncompliance and substandard conditions issued on August 8, 2005 and November 20, 2006, was
recorded on August 17, 2005 and November 21, 2006, in book numbers 9175 and 9383, at page(s) number 1814 and
7696, as entry numbers 9463690 and 9916056, in the official records of the County Recorder in and for the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, have been corrected.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Certificate was duly signed this
2007

Orion Goff, B
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

2&.

day of
Inspector of Salt Lake City^
therein are true.

, 2007, personally appeared before me Orion Goff, Building Official
^ftowledged they signed the above certificate and that the statements contained

.QraaO

NQJARY PUBLIC, Residing at Salt LakeCity, Utah

BK 9497 PG 7024
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,
D. Utah,
Central Division.
CITY OF PAGE, COCONINO COUNTY,
ARIZONA, a political subdivision and municipal
corporation of the State of Arizona, Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL POWER
SYSTEMS ("UAMPS"), a Utah public entity and an
interlocal cooperative agency, Defendant.
No. 2:05 CV 921 TC.
July 7, 2006.
J. Scott Rhodes, Mia K. Jaksic, Jennings Strouss &
Salmon, Phoenix, AZ, J. Michael Bailey, Vicki M.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
TENA CAMPBELL, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff City of Page, Arizona ("Page"), filed this
lawsuit against Defendant Utah Associated Municipal
Power
Systems
("UAMPS"),
an
interlocal
cooperative agency of which Page is a Member. In its
Complaint, Page alleges nine causes of action against
UAMPS, most of which are in relation to UAMPS's
imposition of a "Cost Recovery Charge" on its
Members. UAMPS filed a motion to dismiss "counts"
three through seven, as well as count nine. The three
causes of action that UAMPS does not challenge
through this motion are all breach of contract claims.
UAMPS's primary contention in support of its
motion is that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
("UGIA") bars nearly all of Page's claims. In relation
to various causes of action, UAMPS also argues that
(1) Page failed to follow procedural rules applicable
to derivative suits, (2) Page failed to plead with
enough particularity to overcome the presumption
that the challenged actions of the UAMPS Board of
Directors were properly left to the business judgment
of the board, and (3) the relevant limitations period
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

bars Page's challenge of the legality of certain
UAMPS meetings.
The court grants in part and denies in part UAMPS's
motion. Specifically, Page's claims for "Conflict of
Interest," "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," and "Unjust
Enrichment/Constructive Trust" are dismissed. The
court agrees with UAMPS that the UGIA has not
expressly waived immunity for those claims. And
although it may be the case that Page's claim for
unjust enrichment falls within the equitable exception
to the immunity doctrine, Page has an adequate
remedy at law to address the allegations underlying
that claim. As a result, it is not appropriate to
exercise equitable jurisdiction over that claim.
UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's request for
declaratory judgments is denied, because those
causes of action fall within the equitable exception to
the immunity doctrine. Additionally, Page has
sufficiently stated a claim that UAMPS violated the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Accordingly,
UAMPS's motion to dismiss that claim is denied.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when the
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. See Moore v. Guthrie. 438 F.3d 1036, 1039
(10th Cir.2006) (all well-pleaded factual allegations
of the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party),
accord Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201
(10th Cir.1998). While well-pleaded factual
allegations are accepted as true, the court makes its
own determination on legal issues. Hall v. Bellman,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "[Dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) 'is a harsh remedy which must be
cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of
the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the
interests of justice.' " Moore. 438 F.3d at 1039
(quoting Duran v. Cam's. 238 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th
Cir.2001) (quotation and citation omitted)). Granting
dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears to a
certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of
the claim." Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Pet rofina. Inc.,
484 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir.1973)
Factual Allegations
*2 The following facts are taken from Page's
I to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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economically unattractive and not one Member of
UAMPS subscribed to the power UAMPS acquired
through those contacts. (See id. at %% 65, 68.)

VAMPS
UAMPS was formed under the Utah Interlocal
Cooperation Act. (See Compl. ^ 2.) That act allows
local governmental units "to cooperate with other
localities on a basis of mutual advantage" in an effort
to efficiently provide services and facilities. Utah
Code Ann. §
11-13-102. UAMPS consists of
approximately forty-five Members and is governed
internally by its Amended and Restated Bylaws
("Bylaws") and its Amended and Restated Agreement
for Joint and Cooperative Action ("Joint Action
Agreement"). (See id. at ^ 1f 8-9). The Bylaws
require each Member to appoint a Member
Representative to represent that Member's interests
when UAMPS exercises its powers. (Id. at ^ 10.) The
Bylaws require the UAMPS Board of Directors to act
in the best interest of UAMPS. (Id. at If 11.)
Each Member of UAMPS is required to sign a
Power Pooling Agreement ("Pooling Agreement")
and to subscribe to a power pool. (Id. at ^ 17.) But
Members are not required to consign surplus energy
to the power pool and, similarly, are not required to
purchase energy from the power pool. (Id.) With the
exception of Page's claim that UAMPS violated the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, the claims
UAMPS seeks to dismiss through this motion involve
the Pooling Agreement, (see Pool Agreement,
attached to Compl. as Ex. C).
The UAMPS Power Pool and Cost Recovery Charge
Citing volatility in the energy market, the UAMPS
Power Pool Committee directed UAMPS staff to
acquire "forward-purchase contracts," which are
essentially energy purchase agreements set at a
locked rate. (See Compl. ^ 37.) The purchaser of
such a contract is betting that the locked-in purchase
rate will be lower than the market rate at the time the
purchases are consummated. (See id.)
Although UAMPS received assurances from several
Members that they would subscribe to the forwardpurchased power, UAMPS entered into several
purchase
contacts
without
securing
firm
commitments that Members would subscribe to the
power purchased. (Id. at \ 42.) UAMPS Members
instead waited on the sidelines watching market rates
to determine if subscribing to the power acquired by
UAMPS would be economically beneficial. (See id.
at \ 54.) Prevailing market conditions rendered the
power secured by the forward-purchase contracts

As a result, UAMPS was saddled with uneconomical
forward-purchase contacts and began to take steps to
cover the loss. (See id. at ^f Tf 74-75.) As part of
UAMPS's effort to offset the losses it had suffered,
the UAMPS Board imposed a "Cost Recovery
Charge" on all UAMPS Members.
In its Complaint, Page raises several allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of UAMPS in connection
with the procurement of the forward-purchase
contracts and the steps taken by UAMPS to cover the
losses resulting from those contracts. Page's essential
claim is that UAMPS impermissibly allowed active
participants in the Power Pool to speculate on the
energy market and to use UAMPS Members as a
safety net to cover any losses that could result from
that speculation. According to Page, any profit gained
as a result of the energy-market speculation would
benefit only Power Pool participants, but any loss
would unfairly be allocated to all UAMPS Members,
whether they actively participated in the Power Pool
or not. In short, Page claims that UAMPS failed to
place the interests of UAMPS, as an entity, above the
individual interests of some UAMPS Members.
Open Meetings
*3 In its Complaint, Page also alleges that UAMPS
violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.
Page does not identify any particular meeting that
was held in violation of the act, but claims that
UAMPS held executive meetings without providing
proper notice and without following any approved
procedure to close meetings to the public. Page
additionally alleges that UAMPS took actions against
Page's interest at meetings held in violation of the act.
Analysis
Through this motion, UAMPS is seeking to dismiss
six of Page's causes of action: Cause Three (Conflict
of Interest), Cause Four (Breach of Fiduciary Duty),
Cause Five (Declaratory Judgment Under Arizona
Law), Cause Six (Declaratory Judgment Under Utah
Law), Cause Seven (Unjust Enrichment), and Cause
Nine (Violation of Open Meetings Law). UAMPS
argues that Causes 3-4 (Conflict of Interest and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) should be dismissed
because (1) the UGIA has not expressly waived
immunity from the claims, (2) Page failed to follow
procedural rules applicable to derivative actions, and
(3) Page failed to plead with enough particularity to
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oveicome the presumption that the challenged actions
of the UAMPS Boaid were piopeily left to the
boaid's business judgment UAMPS aigues that
Causes 5-7 (the lequests foi declaiatoiy lehef and
claim for unjust enrichment) aie also baned by the
UGIA Finally, UAMPS contends that Cause 9
(violation of open meetings law) is baned by the
limitations penod set foith in the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act
The couit concludes that the UGIA does not
expiessly waive governmental immunity fiom Page's
claims for conflict of mteiest, bieach of fiduciary
duty, and unjust eniichment Nevertheless, Page
aigues that even if the UGIA does not expiessly
waive immunity fiom Page's unjust eniichment
claim, that claim should not be dismissed because it
falls withm the equitable exception to the immunity
doctnne But Page's contiact claims piovide it with
an adequate lemedy at law to addiess the factual
allegations undeilying its unjust eniichment claim
Accoidmgly, the couit declines to exeicise equity
junsdiction over that claim
Because the couit finds that theie has been no waiver
of immunity fiom Page's claims foi bieach of
fiducialy duty and conflict of mteiest, theie is no
need to addiess UAMPS's aigument that those causes
of action should be dismissed foi failuie to comply
with pioceduial lequnements applicable to denvative
suits Similaily, the couit's conclusion lendeis moot
UAMPS's aigument that those causes should be
dismissed for Page's alleged failuie to overcome the
piesumption that the challenged actions of the
UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the boaid's
business judgment
The couit denies UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's
lequest foi declaiatoiy lehef undei both Anzona and
Utah law Page's declaiatoiy judgment claims fall
within the equitable exception to the immunity
doctrine and, because Page does not have an adequate
lemedy at law to addiess the allegations underlying
its lequest foi declaiatoiy judgments, those claims
may pioceed
*4 Finally, the couit denies UAMPS's lequest to
dismiss Page's claim that UAMPS violated Utah open
meetings laws In outlining this cause of action,
Page's Complaint is sufficient to satisfy the hbeial
notice pleading lequnement and defeat a motion to
dismiss
The Utah Govei nmental Immunity Act

"Governmental immunity is an affiimative defense
to suits against state oi local government" Bucknei v
Kennaid 2004 UT 78, f 35, 99 P 3d 842 But Utah,
thiough the UGIA, has waived its immunity fiom
ceitain types of claims See id Utah also lecogmzes a
common law exception to the UGIA that allows
plaintiffs to puisue equitable claims See El Rancho
Elite? v, Inc v Mini ay City Coip , 565 P 2d 778, 779
(Utah 1977) ("The common law exception to
governmental immunity pei taming to equitable
claims has long been lecogmzed m this
junsdiction") Page concedes that UAMPS enjoys
govei nmental immunity to the extent that immunity
is not waived by the UGIA oi otheiwise abiogated by
the equitable exception to the immunity doctnne
The UGIA's Waiyei of Immunity Is Limited
Page contends that its claims aie not baned because
the UGIA waives immunity for claims that "arise"
fiom contractual lights The heait of the paities'
disagieement on this point is the piopei mterpietation
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l)(a>(b), which
states
(l)(a) Immunity fiom suit of each governmental
entity is waived as to any contiactual obligation
(b) Actions ansmg out of conti actual lights or
obligations are not subject to the lequnements of
Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d, 403, or
63-30d-601 [all of which 1 elate to notification and
initiation pioceduies]
Page aigues that the language of subsections (a) and
(b) must be consideied togethei and that, theiefoie,
the UGIA waives immunity for all conti actual
obligations as well as any claim that "anses out" of a
contiactual lelationship Accoidmg to Page, Causes
3-4 (bieach of fiduciaiy duty and conflict of mteiest)
anse out of contiact because they aie piennsed on
UAMPS's alleged violation of expiess contiactual
language that lequnes UAMPS to "act in the best
mteiests of the UAMPS " (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot
to Dismiss Counts Thiee Thiough Seven and Nine 78, see id ("[T]he plain language of the Complaint
casts Causes of Action Three and Four as ansmg
dnectly fiom the contiactual obligations set foith in
the Bylaws Page has suffeied a dnect haim as a
result of UAMPS' failuie to comply with expiess
conti actual pi oyisions lequiimg UAMPS to act m the
'best mteiests of the UAMPS' and foibiddmg it fiom
holding Page liable for the debts and liabilities of
othei Membeis ") Moie specifically, Page claims that
the UAMPS Boaid was "conti actually lequned
to
iefiam fiom engaging in conflict of mteiest
tiansactions and voting," and "conti actually lequued
to uphold then fiduciaiy duty to the oigamzation and
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its Members," and that the breach of express
contractual provisions "entitled] Page to bring its
conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty
causes of action. {Id. at 11.) Additionally, Page
argues that its unjust enrichment claim arises out of
contract because UAMPS was unjustly enriched as a
direct result of its breach of contract.
*5 Page's argument boils down to an assertion that
its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of
interest, and unjust enrichment "arisfe] directly" from
a breach of express contract but are not breach of
express contract claims in and of themselves. Case
law does provide some support for Page's position
that some claims can be considered as "arising" from
contract. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an
independent tort that, on occasion, arises from a
contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 8L %
35, 57 P.3d 997. See Sadwickv. Univ. of Utah. 2001
WL 741285 (D.Utah 2001) ("Although an action for
breach of fiduciary duty may on rare occasions sound
in contract, see Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982),
under Utah law contracts rarely implicate a fiduciary
relationship. See Semenov v. Hill. 982 P.2d 578, 580
(Utah 1999).").
UAMPS counters that it makes no difference
whether Page's causes of action "arise" from contact
because, properly inteipreted, the UGIA's waiver of
immunity is not broad enough to encompass such
claims. According to UAMPS, the broad
interpretation of the UGIA proposed by Page would
eviscerate governmental
immunity, rendering
governmental entities exposed to any and all claims
of a potential plaintiff whenever a contact is
implicated in some fashion. The court agrees with
UAMPS, at least so far as Causes 3-4 and Cause 7
(breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, and
unjust enrichment) are concerned.
When interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the
puipose the statute was meant to achieve. Foutz v.
City of'S Jordan. 2004 UT 74 % 11. 100 P.3d 1171
(internal quotation omitted). And the plain language
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l) does not support
Page's assertion that the State of Utah has waived
governmental immunity for claims "arising out of
contractual rights or obligations."
In interpreting the UGIA's waiver provision, Page
puts the proverbial cart before the horse and asks the
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court to read the statute backward, with subsection
(b) defining the scope of the immunity waived by
subsection (a). But the more appropriate
interpretation is that subsection (a) waives immunity
for contact claims and that subsection (b) waives
notice requirements for any claim brought under
subsection (a). It is evident from the plain language
of the statute that subsection (a) directly identifies the
scope of the waiver, while subsection (b) deals only
with the issues of notice and suit initiation. In short,
subsection (b) does not attempt to modify the scope
of the waiver announced in subsection (a). Therefore,
it would be incorrect to rely on subsection (b) as an
aid to ascertain the scope of the waiver announced in
subsection (a). [FN1]
FN1. In contrast to Utah Code section 6330d-301(l)(b), the plain language of
subsection (c) unquestionably modifies the
scope of the waiver announced in subsection
(a). Subsection (c) expressly retains
immunity for the Division of Water
Resources in certain situations where the
Division is unable to meet contractual
obligations to provide a set amount of water.
The clear intent of subsection (c) is to
modify the scope of the immunity waived by
subsection (a). A similarly clear expression
of legislative intent to modify the scope of
waived immunity is noticeably lacking in
subsection (b).
Given the above, the court concludes that Utah Code
section 63-30d-301(l) does not waive UAMPS's
immunity from Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 of Page's
Complaint (breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of
interest, and unjust enrichment). Because Page has
made no argument that its claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and conflict of interest are allowable
under another section of the UGIA or fall within the
equitable exception to the UGIA, those two claims
must be dismissed on governmental immunity
grounds.
Equitable Exception
*6 Page argues that even if the UGIA does not
contain an express waiver allowing Page to pursue
Cause 7 (unjust enrichment), that claim falls within
the equitable exception to the immunity doctrine and
should therefore not be dismissed. Page also argues
that its requests for declaratory relief under Arizona
and Utah law (Causes 5-6) fall within the equitable
exception and should not be dismissed.
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The Utah Supieme Couit has frequently lecogmzed
a common-law exception to the governmental
immunity doctime that enables plaintiffs to puisue
equitable claims m spite of governmental immunity
See eg, Houzhton v Dept of Health, 2005 UT 63, f
19 n 3, 125 P 3d 860, El Rancho Entei s Inc, 565
P 2d at 780 The equitable exception to the immunity
doctime suivived the passage of the UGIA See
Houzhton. 2005 UT 63 at f 19 n 3 But the exact
scope of the equitable exception lemams ill-defined
Unjust Em ichment
Even if Page's unjust enrichment claim falls within
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime, it is
neveitheless appiopnate to dismiss that cause of
action fiom this suit because Page has an adequate
lemedy at law See Buckner v Kennaid, 2004 UT 78,
If 56, 99 P3d 842 ("[T]he geneial rule is that
equitable junsdiction is piecluded if the plaintiff has
an adequate lemedy at law and will not suffei
substantial niepaiable mjuiy Equitable junsdiction is
not justifiable simply because a paity's lemedy at law
failed " (internal citations omitted)), see also William
Q de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity 38 (2d ed
1956) ("The want of equity junsdiction does not
mean that the couit has no powei to act but that it
should not act, as on the giound, foi example, that
theie is an adequate lemedy at law") In Utah, the
ability to puisue an unjust emichment claim
piesupposes the absence of an enfoiceable expiess
contact See Am Toweis Owneis Ass'n v CCI
Mech . 930 P 2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996) ("If a legal
lemedy is available, such as breach of an expiess
contiact, the law will not imply the equitable lemedy
of unjust emichment"), Davies v Olson, 746 P 2d
264, 268 (Utah CtAppl987) ( "Recoveiy under
quantum meiuit piesupposes that no enfoiceable
wntten oi oial contiact exists ")
Heie, the parties agiee that theie aie valid, expiess
contracts that govern the relationship between
UAMPS and Page A leview of Page's unjust
emichment claim leveals that Page, thiough that
claim, challenges the veiy actions at issue in its
expiess contiact claims In shoit, Page has an
adequate lemedy at law foi the allegations that seive
as the foundation foi its unjust emichment claim and
its unjust emichment claim is theiefoie dismissed
Page's Request foi Declai atoi y Judgments
Page's Complaint also contains a lequest foi
declaiatoiy judgments undei both Arizona and Utah
law Specifically, Page lequests declaiations that the

Cost Recoveiy Charge, as well as ceitam loans to
UAMPS fiom Zions Fust National Bank aie ultia
vnes and void undei eithei Anzona law, Utah law, oi
both Page lepiesents that it "do[es] not seek money
or damages" under Causes 5-6 (the declaratoiy
judgment lequests), but only a declaration conceimng
the legal authonty of UAMPS's and Page's authonty
m Ielation to the Cost Recovery Chaige and the loans
fiom Zions Bank (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot to
Dismiss Counts Thiee Through Seven and Nine 15 )
*7 Accoidmgly, Page argues that its request foi
declaiatoiy judgments falls withm the equitable
exception to the immunity doctime The couit agiees
Both El Rancho Enteipuses, 565 P 2d at 779-80, and
Jenkins v Swan. 675 P 2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983),
indicate that lequests for equitable relief aie not
baned by governmental immunity and that the notice
piovisions of the UGIA are inapplicable to equitable
claims See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1154 ("Jenkins seeks
equitable lehef m the foim of a declaiatoiy
judgment
[EJquitable claims of this natuie
aie
exempt fiom the notice lequirements") Indeed,
Page's lequests for declaratory lehef appear strikingly
similai to the types of claims m El Rancho
Entei puses and Jenkins, namely, whether a
governmental entity was acting within its lawful
authonty See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1148 (action
challenging peimissibihty of piopeity tax piactices),
El Rancho Entei puses, 595 P 2d at 780 (oveichaiges
by municipality "made by mistake oi fiaud and
without authonty of law")
Unlike Page's unjust emichment claim, the
allegations contained in Page's lequest foi declaiatoiy
judgments laise issues that extend beyond the
boundanes of the express contracts that otheiwise
govern UAMPS If the couit dismissed Page's lequest
for declaiatoiy judgments, it would effectively
deprive Page of any lehef wan anted by the
allegations serving as the foundation foi that lequest
Accoidmgly, UAMPS's motion to dismiss those
claims is denied
Open and Public Meetings Act
Finally, it is piemature to dismiss Page's claim that
UAMPS violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act UAMPS aigues that this cause of action should
be dismissed because Page failed to file suit within
ninety days of a meeting allegedly held in violation
of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act See Utah
Code Ann § 52-4-8 (lequnmg suits seeking to void
final actions taken at meetings held m violation of the
act to be commenced w lthm ninety days of the final
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action). [FN2]
FN2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act was renumbered and amended during
the 2006 General Session of the Utah State
Legislature. Because the prior version of the
act was in effect at the time Page filed its
Complaint and because the parties have
relied on that version while briefing this
issue, the court similarly cites to the
previous version. No party has alleged that
the revisions to the act in any way materially
effect Page's claim.
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exception to the immunity doctrine and seek relief on
a broader scale than a simple recovery under contact.
The court dismisses Page's seventh cause of action
(unjust enrichment) because the UGIA has not
waived immunity from that claim and Page possesses
an adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged
wrong. Finally, the court declines to dismiss Page's
ninth cause of action pertaining to alleged violations
of open meetings law. That claim sufficiently states a
cause of action under the liberal rules of notice
pleading to overcome UAMPS's request for
dismissal.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2006.

Page's Complaint does not identify any specific dates
on which it alleges UAMPS held meetings in
violation of the Open and Public Meetings Act. Also,
Page does not confine its requested relief to voiding
final actions taken by UAMPS. Rather, it seeks an
order compelling UAMPS to comply with the act and
making public any information evidencing what was
discussed during meetings that were improperly
closed. (See Compl. ^ 261.)

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882
(D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT

Although Page's allegations do not provide specific
dates of improper meetings, its Complaint does allege
that UAMPS violated the act, and specifically claims
that UAMPS held meetings without providing
adequate notice and also illegally closed meetings.
Applying liberal rules of notice pleading, Page's
claim is sufficient to withstand a request for
dismissal. See Corbin v. Runyon, No. 98-6288, 1999
WL 590749 (10th Cir. Aim. 6, 1999) ("Even though
Ms. Corbin's second amended complaint is certainly
not a picture of clarity, it is sufficient under our
liberal notice pleading rules to survive a motion to
dismiss." (citing Porter v. Karavas, 157 F.2d 984,
985-86 (10th Cir. 1946) ( "Indefiniteness of a
complaint is not ground for dismissing the action if it
states a claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.")). Accordingly, Page has sufficiently stated a
claim that UAMPS violated the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act, and UAMPS's motion to
dismiss that claim is premature.
Conclusion
*8 The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
UAMPS's Motion to Dismiss Counts Three Through
Seven and Nine. The court dismisses Page's third and
fourth causes of action (Conflict of Interest and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) because the UGIA has not
expressly waived immunity from those claims. The
court declines to dismiss Page's fifth and sixth causes
of action (both requests for declaratory relief)
because those claims fall within the equitable
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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bars Page's challenge of the legality of certain
UAMPS meetings.

United States District Court,
D. Utah,
Central Division.
CITY OF PAGE, COCONINO COUNTY,
ARIZONA, a political subdivision and municipal
corporation of the State of Arizona, Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL POWER
SYSTEMS ("UAMPS"), a Utah public entity and an
interlocal cooperative agency, Defendant.
No. 2:05 CV 921 TC.

The court grants in part and denies in part UAMPS's
motion. Specifically, Page's claims for "Conflict of
Interest," "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," and "Unjust
Enrichment/Constructive Trust" are dismissed. The
court agrees with UAMPS that the UGIA has not
expressly waived immunity for those claims. And
although it may be the case that Page's claim for
unjust enrichment falls within the equitable exception
to the immunity doctrine, Page has an adequate
remedy at law to address the allegations underlying
that claim. As a result, it is not appropriate to
exercise equitable jurisdiction over that claim.
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Salmon, Phoenix, AZ, J. Michael Bailey, Vicki M.
Baldwin, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City,
UT, for Plaintiff.
Matthew F. McNulty, HI, John P. Ashton, Sam
Meziani, Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy,
Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
TENA CAMPBELL, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff City of Page, Arizona ("Page"), filed this
lawsuit against Defendant Utah Associated Municipal
Power
Systems
("UAMPS"),
an
interlocal
cooperative agency of which Page is a Member. In its
Complaint, Page alleges nine causes of action against
UAMPS, most of which are in relation to UAMPS's
imposition of a "Cost Recovery Charge" on its
Members. UAMPS filed a motion to dismiss "counts"
three through seven, as well as count nine. The three
causes of action that UAMPS does not challenge
through this motion are all breach of contract claims.
UAMPS's primary contention in support of its
motion is that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
("UGIA") bars nearly all of Page's claims. In relation
to various causes of action, UAMPS also argues that
(1) Page failed to follow procedural rules applicable
to derivative suits, (2) Page failed to plead with
enough particularity to overcome the presumption
that the challenged actions of the UAMPS Board of
Directors were properly left to the business judgment
of the board, and (3) the relevant limitations period
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's request for
declaratory judgments is denied, because those
causes of action fall within the equitable exception to
the immunity doctrine. Additionally, Page has
sufficiently stated a claim that UAMPS violated the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Accordingly,
UAMPS's motion to dismiss that claim is denied.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when the
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039
(10th Cir.2006) (all well-pleaded factual allegations
of the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party),
accord Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201
(10th Cir.1998). While well-pleaded factual
allegations are accepted as true, the court makes its
own determination on legal issues. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "[Dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) 'is a harsh remedy which must be
cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of
the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the
interests of justice.' " Moore, 438 F.3d at 1039
(quoting Puran v. Cam's, 238 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th
Cir.2001) (quotation and citation omitted)). Granting
dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears to a
certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of
the claim." Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Petrofina, Inc.,
484 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir.1973)
Factual Allegations
*2 The following facts are taken from Page's
l to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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economically unatti active and not one Membei of
UAMPS subsenbed to the power UAMPS acquned
thiough those contiacts (See id at ^ 65, 68 )

VAMPS
UAMPS was formed undei the Utah Interlocal
Cooperation Act (See Compl If 2 ) That act allows
local governmental units "to coopeiate with othei
localities on a basis of mutual advantage" in an effort
to efficiently piovide seivices and facilities Utah
Code Ann §
11-13-102 UAMPS consists of
appioximately foity-five Members and is governed
internally by its Amended and Restated Bylaws
("Bylaws") and its Amended and Restated Agieement
foi Joint and Coopeiative Action ("Joint Action
Agieement") (See id at H ^ 8-9) The Bylaws
lequne each Membei to appoint a Member
Repiesentative to repiesent that Membei's mteiests
when UAMPS exeicises its powers (Id at Tf 10) The
Bylaws lequne the UAMPS Boaid of Duectois to act
in the best mteiest of UAMPS (Id at^f 11)
Each Membei of UAMPS is lequned to sign a
Power Pooling Agieement ("Pooling Agieement")
and to subscube to a power pool (Id at ^ 17 ) But
Membeis aie not lequned to consign surplus eneigy
to the powei pool and, similarly, aie not lequned to
puichase eneigy fiom the powei pool (Id) With the
exception of Page's claim that UAMPS violated the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, the claims
UAMPS seeks to dismiss thiough this motion involve
the Pooling Agieement, (see Pool Agieement,
attached to Compl as Ex C)
The UAMPS Powei Pool and Cost Recoveiy Chaige
Citing volatility in the eneigy maiket, the UAMPS
Powei Pool Committee dnected UAMPS staff to
acqune "foiwaid-puichase contiacts," which aie
essentially eneigy pui chase agieements set at a
locked rate (See Compl ^ 37) The pui chaser of
such a contract is betting that the locked-in pui chase
late will be lowei than the maiket late at the time the
pui chases aie consummated (See id)
Although UAMPS leceived assuiances fiom seveial
Membeis that they would subscube to the foiwaidpui chased powei, UAMPS enteied into seveial
pui chase
contiacts
without
seeming
fiim
commitments that Membei s would subscube to the
powei pui chased (Id at ^ 42) UAMPS Membei s
instead waited on the sidelines watching maiket lates
to determine if subscribing to the powei acquned by
UAMPS would be economically beneficial (See id
at TI 54) Pievailmg maiket conditions lendeied the
powei seemed by the foiwaid-pui chase contiacts

As a lesult, UAMPS was saddled with uneconomical
foiwaid-pm chase contracts and began to take steps to
cover the loss (See id at 1f | 74-75) As pait of
UAMPS's effoit to offset the losses it had suffeied,
the UAMPS Board imposed a "Cost Recoveiy
Chaige" on all UAMPS Membeis
In its Complaint, Page laises seveial allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of UAMPS m connection
with the piocuiement of the foiwaid-pui chase
contiacts and the steps taken by UAMPS to cover the
losses resulting fiom those contiacts Page's essential
claim is that UAMPS impeimissibly allowed active
paiticipants m the Powei Pool to speculate on the
eneigy market and to use UAMPS Membeis as a
safety net to cover any losses that could lesult fiom
that speculation Accoidmg to Page, any piofit gained
as a lesult of the energy-market speculation would
benefit only Power Pool paiticipants, but any loss
would unfairly be allocated to all UAMPS Membeis,
whethei they actively paiticipated m the Powei Pool
or not In shoit, Page claims that UAMPS failed to
place the mteiests of UAMPS, as an entity, above the
individual mteiests of some UAMPS Membeis
Open Meetings
*3 In its Complaint, Page also alleges that UAMPS
violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act
Page does not identify any paiticular meeting that
was held in violation of the act, but claims that
UAMPS held executive meetings without piovidmg
proper notice and without following any appioved
pioceduie to close meetings to the public Page
additionally alleges that UAMPS took actions against
Page's mteiest at meetings held m violation of the act
Analysis
Thiough this motion, UAMPS is seeking to dismiss
six of Page's causes of action Cause Three (Conflict
of Intel est), Cause Foui (Bleach of Fiduciaiy Duty),
Cause Five (Declaiatoiy Judgment Under Anzona
Law), Cause Six (Declaiatoiy Judgment Undei Utah
Law), Cause Seven (Unjust Enrichment), and Cause
Nine (Violation of Open Meetings Law) UAMPS
aigues that Causes 3-4 (Conflict of Inteiest and
Bieach of Fiduciaiy Duty) should be dismissed
because (1) the UGIA has not expiessly waived
immunity fiom the claims, (2) Page failed to follow
piocedmal lules applicable to denvative actions, and
(3) Page failed to plead with enough paiticulanty to
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oveicome the piesumption that the challenged actions
of the UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the
boaid's business judgment UAMPS aigues that
Causes 5-7 (the lequests for declaiatory lehef and
claim for unjust emichment) aie also baned by the
UGIA Finally, UAMPS contends that Cause 9
(violation of open meetings law) is baned by the
limitations period set foith m the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act
The couit concludes that the UGIA does not
expressly waive governmental immunity fiom Page's
claims foi conflict of mteiest, bieach of fiduciary
duty, and unjust enrichment Nevertheless, Page
aigues that even if the UGIA does not expiessly
waive immunity fiom Page's unjust emichment
claim, that claim should not be dismissed because it
falls within the equitable exception to the immunity
doctime But Page's contiact claims piovide it with
an adequate lemedy at law to addiess the factual
allegations undeilying its unjust emichment claim
Accordingly, the court declines to exeicise equity
junsdiction ovei that claim
Because the court finds that theie has been no waiver
of immunity fiom Page's claims for bieach of
fiducialy duty and conflict of mteiest, theie is no
need to addiess UAMPS's aigument that those causes
of action should be dismissed for failuie to comply
with pioceduial lequiiements applicable to denvative
suits Similaily, the court's conclusion lendeis moot
UAMPS's aigument that those causes should be
dismissed foi Page's alleged failuie to oveicome the
piesumption that the challenged actions of the
UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the boaid's
business judgment
The court denies UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's
lequest foi declaiatoiy lehef undei both Anzona and
Utah law Page's declaiatoiy judgment claims fall
within the equitable exception to the immunity
doctime and, because Page does not have an adequate
remedy at law to addiess the allegations undei lying
its lequest for declaiatoiy judgments, those claims
may pioceed
*4 Finally, the court denies UAMPS's lequest to
dismiss Page's claim that UAMPS violated Utah open
meetings laws In outlining this cause of action,
Page's Complaint is sufficient to satisfy the hbeial
notice pleading lequnement and defeat a motion to
dismiss
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act

Page 3

"Governmental immunity is an affiimative defense
to suits against state oi local government" Bucknei v
Keimaid. 2004 UT 78, f 35, 99 P 3d 842 But Utah,
thiough the UGIA, has waived its immunity fiom
certain types of claims See id Utah also lecogmzes a
common law exception to the UGIA that allows
plaintiffs to pursue equitable claims See El Rancho
Entei v, fnc v Munay City Coip , 565 P 2d 778, 779
(Utah 1977) ("The common law exception to
governmental immunity pertaining to equitable
claims has long been lecogmzed m this
jurisdiction") Page concedes that UAMPS enjoys
governmental immunity to the extent that immunity
is not waived by the UGIA oi otheiwise abiogated by
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime
The UGIA's Waivei of Immunity Is Limited
Page contends that its claims aie not baned because
the UGIA waives immunity for claims that "arise"
fiom contiactual lights The heart of the parties'
disagieement on this point is the piopei mterpietation
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l)(a)-(b), which
states
(l)(a) Immunity fiom suit of each governmental
entity is waived as to any conti actual obligation
(b) Actions ansmg out of conti actual lights or
obligations are not subject to the lequiiements of
Sections 63-30(1-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d, 403, or
63-30d-601 [all of which lelate to notification and
initiation piocedmes]
Page aigues that the language of subsections (a) and
(b) must be consideied togethei and that, theiefoie,
the UGIA waives immunity for all conti actual
obligations as well as any claim that "anses out" of a
conti actual lelationship Accoidmg to Page, Causes
3-4 (bieach of fiduciaiy duty and conflict of mteiest)
anse out of contiact because they aie piemised on
UAMPS's alleged violation of expiess contiactual
language that lequnes UAMPS to "act in the best
mteiests of the UAMPS " (Plfs Opp'n to Def's Mot
to Dismiss Counts Thiee Thiough Seven and Nine 78, see id ("[T]he plain language of the Complaint
casts Causes of Action Thiee and Foui as ansing
dnectly fiom the contiactual obligations set forth in
the Bylaws
Page has suffeied a duect haim as a
result of UAMPS' failuie to comply with expiess
conti actual pi ovisions lequnmg UAMPS to act in the
'best mteiests of the UAMPS' and foibiddmg it fiom
holding Page liable foi the debts and liabilities of
other Membeis ") Moie specifically, Page claims that
the UAMPS Boaid was "conti actually lequued
to
lefiam fiom engaging in conflict of interest
tiansactions and voting," and "contiactually lequued
to uphold then fiduciary duty to the oigamzation and

© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah))
its Members," and that the breach of express
contractual provisions "entitlfed] Page to bring its
conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty
causes of action. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, Page
argues that its unjust enrichment claim arises out of
contact because UAMPS was unjustly enriched as a
direct result of its breach of contract.
*5 Page's argument boils down to an assertion that
its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of
interest, and unjust enrichment "arisfe] directly" from
a breach of express contract but are not breach of
express contract claims in and of themselves. Case
law does provide some support for Page's position
that some claims can be considered as "arising" from
contract. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an
independent tort that, on occasion, arises from a
contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 81, f
35, 57 P.3d 997. See Sadwick v. Univ. of Utah. 2001
WL 741285 (D.Utah 2001) ("Although an action for
breach of fiduciary duty may on rare occasions sound
in contract, see Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982),
under Utah law contracts rarely implicate a fiduciary
relationship. See Semenov v. Hill, 982 P.2d 578, 580
(Utah 1999).").
UAMPS counters that it makes no difference
whether Page's causes of action "arise" from contract
because, properly interpreted, the UGIA's waiver of
immunity is not broad enough to encompass such
claims. According to UAMPS, the broad
interpretation of the UGIA proposed by Page would
eviscerate governmental
immunity, rendering
governmental entities exposed to any and all claims
of a potential plaintiff whenever a contract is
implicated in some fashion. The court agrees with
UAMPS, at least so far as Causes 3-4 and Cause 7
(breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, and
unjust enrichment) are concerned.
When interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the
puipose the statute was meant to achieve. Foutz v.
City ofS. Jordan, 2004 UT 74 <f| 11, 100 P.3d 1171
(internal quotation omitted). And the plain language
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l) does not support
Page's assertion that the State of Utah has waived
governmental immunity for claims "arising out of
contractual rights or obligations."
In interpreting the UGIA's waiver provision, Page
puts the proverbial cart before the horse and asks the

Page 4

court to read the statute backward, with subsection
(b) defining the scope of the immunity waived by
subsection (a). But the more appropriate
interpretation is that subsection (a) waives immunity
for contract claims and that subsection (b) waives
notice requirements for any claim brought under
subsection (a). It is evident from the plain language
of the statute that subsection (a) directly identifies the
scope of the waiver, while subsection (b) deals only
with the issues of notice and suit initiation. In short,
subsection (b) does not attempt to modify the scope
of the waiver announced in subsection (a). Therefore,
it would be incorrect to rely on subsection (b) as an
aid to ascertain the scope of the waiver announced in
subsection (a). [FN1]
FN1. In contrast to Utah Code section 6330d-301(l)(b), the plain language of
subsection (c) unquestionably modifies the
scope of the waiver announced in subsection
(a). Subsection (c) expressly retains
immunity for the Division of Water
Resources in certain situations where the
Division is unable to meet contractual
obligations to provide a set amount of water.
The clear intent of subsection (c) is to
modify the scope of the immunity waived by
subsection (a). A similarly clear expression
of legislative intent to modify the scope of
waived immunity is noticeably lacking in
subsection (b).
Given the above, the court concludes that Utah Code
section 63-30d-301(l) does not waive UAMPS's
immunity from Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 of Page's
Complaint (breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of
interest, and unjust enrichment). Because Page has
made no argument that its claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and conflict of interest are allowable
under another section of the UGIA or fall within the
equitable exception to the UGIA, those two claims
must be dismissed on governmental immunity
grounds.
Equitable Exception
*6 Page argues that even if the UGIA does not
contain an express waiver allowing Page to pursue
Cause 7 (unjust enrichment), that claim falls within
the equitable exception to the immunity doctrine and
should therefore not be dismissed. Page also argues
that its requests for declaratory relief under Arizona
and Utah law (Causes 5-6) fall within the equitable
exception and should not be dismissed.
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The Utah Supieme Couit has frequently lecognized
a common-law exception to the governmental
immunity doctime that enables plaintiffs to puisue
equitable claims m spite of governmental immunity
See, eg Houghton v Dept of Health, 2005 UT 63, <[f
19 n 3, 125 P 3d 860, El Rancho Entei s , Jnc, 565
P 2d at 780 The equitable exception to the immunity
doctime suivived the passage of the UGIA See
Houghton. 2005 UT 63 at ^ 19 n 3 But the exact
scope of the equitable exception xemains ill-defined
Unjust Em ichment
Even if Page's unjust em ichment claim falls within
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime, it is
neveitheless appiopiiate to dismiss that cause of
action fiom this suit because Page has an adequate
lemedy at law See Bucknei v Kennaid, 2004 UT 78,
If 56, 99 P3d 842 (M[T]he geneial rule is that
equitable jurisdiction is piecluded if the plaintiff has
an adequate lemedy at law and will not suffei
substantial mepaiable mjmy Equitable junsdiction is
not justifiable simply because a paity's lemedy at law
failed " (internal citations omitted)), see also William
Q de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity 38 (2d ed
1956) ("The want of equity junsdiction does not
mean that the couit has no powei to act but that it
should not act, as on the giound, foi example, that
there is an adequate remedy at law") In Utah, the
ability to puisue an unjust em ichment claim
piesupposes the absence of an enfoiceable expiess
contiact See Am Toweis Owneis Ass'n \ CCI
Mech . 930 P 2d 1182. 1193 (Utah 1996) ("If a legal
lemedy is available, such as bieach of an expiess
contiact, the law will not imply the equitable lemedy
of unjust em ichment "), Davies v Olson, 746 P 2d
264, 268 (Utah CtApp 1987) ( "Recoveiy under
quantum meiuit piesupposes that no enfoiceable
wntten or oial contiact exists ")
Heie, the paities agiee that theie aie valid, expiess
contacts that govern the lelationship between
UAMPS and Page A leview of Page's unjust
em ichment claim leveals that Page, thiough that
claim, challenges the veiy actions at issue in its
expiess contiact claims In shoit, Page has an
adequate lemedy at law foi the allegations that seive
as the foundation foi its unjust em ichment claim and
its unjust em ichment claim is theiefoie dismissed
Page's Request foi Declai atoiy Judgments
Page's Complaint also contains a lequest for
declaiatoiy judgments undei both Arizona and Utah
law Specifically, Page lequests declaiations that the

Cost Recoveiy Charge, as well as certain loans to
UAMPS fiom Zions First National Bank aie ultia
vnes and void undei eithei Anzona law, Utah law, or
both Page represents that it "do[es] not seek money
or damages" under Causes 5-6 (the declaratoiy
judgment lequests), but only a declaiation concerning
the legal authonty of UAMPS's and Page's authonty
m Ielation to the Cost Recoveiy Charge and the loans
fiom Zions Bank (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot to
Dismiss Counts Thiee Through Seven and Nine 15 )
*7 Accoidmgly, Page aigues that its lequest for
declaratory judgments falls withm the equitable
exception to the immunity doctime The couit agiees
Both El Rancho Enteipuses, 565 P 2d at 779-80, and
Jenkins v Swan. 675 P 2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983),
indicate that lequests foi equitable lehef aie not
baned by governmental immunity and that the notice
piovisions of the UGIA aie inapplicable to equitable
claims See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1154 ("Jenkins seeks
equitable lehef m the foim of a declaratoiy
judgment
[EJquitable claims of this natuie
aie
exempt fiom the notice lequirements") Indeed,
Page's lequests for declaiatory lehef appear strikingly
similai to the types of claims m El Rancho
Enteipuses and Jenkins, namely, whether a
governmental entity was acting within its lawful
authonty See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1148 (action
challenging peimissibihty of piopeity tax piactices),
El Rancho Entei puses, 595 P 2d at 780 (overchaiges
by municipality "made by mistake or fiaud and
without authonty of law")
Unlike Page's unjust em ichment claim, the
allegations contained m Page's lequest foi declaiatoiy
judgments laise issues that extend beyond the
boundanes of the expiess contiacts that otheiwise
govern UAMPS If the couit dismissed Page's lequest
for declaiatoiy judgments, it would effectively
depnve Page of any lehef wan anted by the
allegations seivmg as the foundation foi that lequest
Accoidmgly, UAMPS's motion to dismiss those
claims is denied
Open and Public Meetings Act
Finally, it is piematuie to dismiss Page's claim that
UAMPS violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act UAMPS argues that this cause of action should
be dismissed because Page failed to file suit within
ninety days of a meeting allegedly held m violation
of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act See Utah
Code Ann § 52-4-8 (lequnmg suits seeking to void
final actions taken at meetings held m violation of the
act to be commenced within ninety days of the final
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action). [FN2]
FN2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act was renumbered and amended during
the 2006 General Session of the Utah State
Legislature. Because the prior version of the
act was in effect at the time Page filed its
Complaint and because the parties have
relied on that version while briefing this
issue, the court similarly cites to the
previous version. No party has alleged that
the revisions to the act in any way materially
effect Page's claim.
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exception to the immunity doctrine and seek relief on
a broader scale than a simple recovery under contract.
The court dismisses Page's seventh cause of action
(unjust enrichment) because the UGIA has not
waived immunity from that claim and Page possesses
an adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged
wrong. Finally, the court declines to dismiss Page's
ninth cause of action pertaining to alleged violations
of open meetings law. That claim sufficiently states a
cause of action under the liberal rules of notice
pleading to overcome UAMPS's request for
dismissal.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2006.

Page's Complaint does not identify any specific dates
on which it alleges UAMPS held meetings in
violation of the Open and Public Meetings Act. Also,
Page does not confine its requested relief to voiding
final actions taken by UAMPS. Rather, it seeks an
order compelling UAMPS to comply with the act and
making public any information evidencing what was
discussed during meetings that were improperly
closed. {See Compl. f 261.)

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882
(D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT

Although Page's allegations do not provide specific
dates of improper meetings, its Complaint does allege
that UAMPS violated the act, and specifically claims
that UAMPS held meetings without providing
adequate notice and also illegally closed meetings.
Applying liberal rules of notice pleading, Page's
claim is sufficient to withstand a request for
dismissal. See Corbin v. Runyon. No. 98-6288, 1999
WL 590749 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999) ("Even though
Ms. Corbin's second amended complaint is certainly
not a picture of clarity, it is sufficient under our
liberal notice pleading rules to survive a motion to
dismiss." (citing Porter v. Karavas, 157 F.2d 984,
985-86 (10th Cir. 1946) ( "Indefmiteness of a
complaint is not ground for dismissing the action if it
states a claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief")). Accordingly, Page has sufficiently stated a
claim that UAMPS violated the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act, and UAMPS's motion to
dismiss that claim is premature.
Conclusion
*8 The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
UAMPS's Motion to Dismiss Counts Three Through
Seven and Nine. The court dismisses Page's third and
fourth causes of action (Conflict of Interest and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) because the UGIA has not
expressly waived immunity from those claims. The
court declines to dismiss Page's fifth and sixth causes
of action (both requests for declaratory relief)
because those claims fall within the equitable
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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the rules. Even taking into account Defendant's
circumstances in preparing his brief while
incarcerated, considering references to well settled
principles of law without citation, and giving him the
leniency generally afforded pro se litigants,^
Defendant's brief is nonetheless inadequate for failure
to substantially comply with rule 24.

FN1. We do note that Defendant is not in the
same position as most pro se litigants in that,
as a disbaned attorney, he is law trained.

Nov. 1,2007.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 031902460;
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.
A. Paul Schwenke, Draper, Appellant Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, McHUGH, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE, Judge:
*1 Defendant A. Paul Schwenke appeals from his
jury trial convictions of securities fraud, seeUtah
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006), attempted theft by
deception, seeUtah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003),
communications fraud, see id. §
76-10-1801
(Supp.2007), and pattern of unlawful activity, see id.
§ 76-10-1603 (2003). Because Defendant's brief is
inadequate under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we decline to review his claims.
Accordingly, we affirm.
"It is well established that Utah appellate courts will
not consider claims that are inadequately
bxkfed"State v. Gamer. 2002 UT App 234, ]\ 8, 52
P.3d 467. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9)
states that the appellant's brief "shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on.'TJtah R.App. P. 24(a)(9).
Although appellate courts are generally lenient with
pro se litigants, see Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \
4, 67 P.3d 1000, such parties must still comply with

We initially note that Defendant failed to demonstrate
grounds for reviewing issues not preserved in the trial
court. Defendant argues for the first time on appeal
that (1) his convictions violate his constitutional right
against double jeopardy; (2) the trial court erred in its
jury instructions on the elements of attempted theft
by deception and communications fraud; and (3) the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
his convictions of securities fraud, communications
fraud, and pattern of unlawful activity. " 'Under
ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue
brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial
court committed plain error or exceptional
circumstances exist.' " State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f
45, 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner,
2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186). Defendant did not,
in his opening brief, argue that plain error or
exceptional circumstances existed to justify a review
of these issues.—Defendant did assert, in his reply
brief, that the issues raised on appeal were questions
of law and plain error. However, "we will not
consider matters raised for the first time in the reply
brief." Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d
1122. Because Defendant failed to argue that plain
error or exceptional circumstances exist to justify a
review of those issues, we decline to consider them
on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229
n. 5 (Utah 1995).

FN2. Defendant, in his statement of the
issues presented in his opening brief,
identified the standard of review for the first
two issues as plain error, but did not argue
plain error in his opening brief.
*2 Even if Defendant's issues were properly
preserved, we would nonetheless decline to review
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his issues because Defendant's brief is, in large part,
devoid of any meaningful legal analysis.
"[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs
must comply with the briefing requirements
sufficiently to enable us to understand ... what
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the
record those errors can be found, and why, under
applicable authorities, those errors are material ones
necessitating reversal or other relief."

argument that the stock at issue was only a "paper
transfer" and therefore was not a security. Neither
does Defendant provide any supporting legal analysis
for this contention. Likewise, other citations
pertaining to communications fraud and partem of
unlawful activity are similarly afflicted. Because
Defendant fails to provide meaningful analysis or
supporting legal citation for his insufficiency of the
evidence arguments, we decline to review them.

Garner. 2002 UT App 234. f 13 (alteration and
omission in original) (quoting State v. Lucero, 2002
UT App 135, 1[ 13, 47 P.3d 107VThis analysis
'requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority.' " Id. \ 12 (quoting State v.
Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)).

*3 Defendant also failed to adequately brief his
argument that defense counsel was ineffective. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,
Defendant must show that his counsel "rendered
deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and ...
counsel's
deficient
performance
prejudiced
\\imrState v. Hernandez. 2005 UT App 546, f 17,
128 P.3d 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Defendant references the two-part test
previously stated, he fails to challenge the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. See
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Defendant also makes no attempt to demonstrate how
defense counsel's actions or inactions fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness or prejudiced
Defendant in any manner. Instead, Defendant merely
lists defense counsel's alleged failings and concludes
that the various failings constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, "[a] brief must go
beyond providing conclusory statements and 'fully
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments.' " West
Jordan City v. Goodman. 2006 UT 27, ^ 29, 135
P.3d 874 (quoting State v. Green. 2005 UT 9, f 11,
108 P.3d 710). Because Defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel argument provides no relevant
legal citation or meaningful analysis, we decline to
review this issue based on inadequate briefing.

Defendant's arguments on appeal consist, in large
part, of conclusory statements without relevant legal
citations and reasoned analysis based on that
authority. Defendant's argument that the trial court
erred in its jury instructions on attempted theft by
deception and communications fraud provides an
illustration of his inadequate briefing. Defendant
asserts that the jury instructions reduced the State's
burden of proof because the instructions improperly
state the elements of attempted theft by deception and
communications
fraud.
However,
the jury
instructions track the statutory language, and
Defendant fails to address or otherwise identify the
manner in which either of the jury instructions
conflict with the statutory language to reduce the
State's burden. SeeUtah Code Ann. § § 76-6-405, 76=
10-1801. Because the relevant jury instructions track
the statutory language and Defendant demonstrates
no conflict, we conclude that Defendant has failed to
brief a challenge to the jury instruction issue
sufficient to permit review.
Similarly, Defendant also failed to adequately brief
his argument that the evidence was insufficient to
support his jury trial convictions of securities fraud,
communications fraud, and pattern of unlawful
activity. In arguing that the State failed to prove
various elements, Defendant provides few relevant
citations to legal authority and no legal basis for his
contention that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support his convictions. For example,
Defendant provides one citation pertaining to his
securities fraud argument that the stock at issue was
not a security. However, the case cited, Securities &
Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howev Co., 328 U.S.
293 (1946), which addresses federal securities fraud
law, does not provide support for Defendant's

Likewise, Defendant fails to adequately analyze the
issues pertaining to his argument that the trial court
erred in permitting the State to amend the charge of
theft to attempted theft by deception. An indictment
or information may be amended with the trial court's
permission at any time before verdict if no additional
or different offense is charged and the substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. ffgeUtah
R.Crim. P. 4(d). Defendant asserts that, because the
attempted theft by deception charge involves
different elements of proof than the original charge
— of theft, the theft by deception charge is a new
and separate offense for which he was not properly
charged. Therefore he contends that he was convicted
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misrepresentation, which is not necessary
for a theft conviction. SeeUtah Code Ann. §
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Although the two theft charges at issue involve
different elements, this does not in and of itself
demonstrate that attempted theft by deception is a
new and separate offense. Utah's consolidated theft
statute provides that a theft by deception charge is a
theory of theft and not a separate offense. ffgeUtah
Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (2003). Neither does the
information's amendment to charge a different theory
of theft necessarily offend the procedural safeguards
in the criminal process. Under Utah's consolidated
theft statute, allowing an information's amendment to
charge a different theory of theft, even though the
theory being advanced involves different elements of
proof, "does not offend the procedural safeguards in
the criminal process, so long as defendant is
adequately notified of the theory being used and
given ample time to prepare a defense to the
charge."Stafe v. Busk 2001 UT App 10, f 16, 47
P.3d 69. Defendant does not claim that he was
inadequately notified of the alternate theory of theft
by deception or that he had inadequate time to
prepare a defense. Rather, he simply argues, without
addressing the contrary holding in Bush, that theft by
deception is a new charge that violates his due
process rights. Because Defendant does not challenge
the Bush holding or claim that he was not afforded
sufficient time to prepare a defense to the amended
charge of theft by deception, his brief is inadequate to
allow review. We therefore decline to address this
issue.
*4 Finally, we address Defendant's motion to strike
an addendum in the State's brief, which contained a
typed copy of Defendant's handwritten brief. The
State did not purport to provide the typed copy as a
substitute for Defendant's brief, rather the State
provided it as a courtesy, which is appreciated.
Although Defendant directs our attention to some
minor differences between the typed and handwritten
versions, he does not point to any errors that affect
the meaning of his brief Because Defendant does not
identify any substantial errors that would affect the
meaning of his brief, we deny Defendant's motion to
strike.
Affirmed.
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